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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
THREE ESSAYS ON EXPORT EARNINGS VOLATILITY
My dissertation consists of three essays on export earnings volatility. In the rst essay, I
look at the determinants of export earnings volatility. e four main determinants sug-
gested by the theoretical literature are export concentration, durability, vertical linkages,
and nancial vulnerability. A panel of bilateral trade data at the industry level, containing
178 exporting countries, 194 importing countries, and 590 SITC Rev. 1 four-digit industries
from 1962 to 2011, is used and these aspects are incorporated to empirically examine their
eects on export earnings volatility. e essay nds that diversifying exports across dif-
ferent industries and trade partners plays an important role in reducing aggregate export
instability. Moreover, exports of durable goods and intermediate inputs exhibit higher
volatility. Unlike its role in explaining the Great Trade Collapse, industry nancial vul-
nerability does not aect the export earnings volatility of developed countries. However,
trade credit reliance and asset tangibility maer in the export instability of developing
countries which have weaker nancial institutions and contractibility.
e second essay is joint work with Dr. Ederington and Dr. Minier. Given that a
frequently stated objective of regional and multilateral trade agreements is to stabilize
and reduce volatility in trade ows, we examine whether trade agreements accomplish
this goal. Using a structural gravity approach we identify two potential channels through
which international trade institutions may inuence the volatility of bilateral trade ows:
by aecting the variance of trade barriers and by aecting the covariance of economic out-
comes between the trading partners. We then use a panel of bilateral industry-level trade
data to empirically examine the eects of regional trade agreements and GATT/WTO
membership on export earnings volatility. We nd that joining a multilateral trade agree-
ment such as the GATT does make export earnings more stable. However, we nd that
signing a regional trade agreement actually raises instability in bilateral exports and that
this rise in volatility increases as the trading partners become more integrated.
e third essay is an empirical study of the eects of export concentration on the
Great Trade Collapse. First, it nds that country pairs whose exports are concentrated on
a small number of products experienced greater reductions in bilateral exports. Second,
it is the rst to look at the relationship between trade ows and trade nance availabil-
ity as a function of export concentration. Using bilateral trade data, the essay nds that
the relationship between the fall in bilateral exports and the fall in the availability of
trade nance, proxied by insured export credits, is more dramatic when exports are con-
centrated on few products. Similarly, using export data at the HS 2002 six-digit product
level, the essay nds the relationship between the fall in product exports and nancial
vulnerability, specically external nance dependence and asset tangibility, to be more
intense when exports are concentrated on few trading partners. is result implies that
exporter-importer (exporter-product) pairs whose exports are more diversied across dif-
ferent products (markets) may be less susceptible to nancial shocks.
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Trade Finance; Trade Agreements; Durable and Intermediate Goods
Author’s signature: Yoonseon Han
Date: July 29, 2021
THREE ESSAYS ON EXPORT EARNINGS VOLATILITY
By
Yoonseon Han
Director of Dissertation: Dr. Josh Ederington
Director of Graduate Studies: Dr. Carlos Lamarche
Date: July 29, 2021
To my husband, Seungki
“Praise be to the name of God forever and ever; wisdom and power are his.” (Daniel 2:20)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to take a moment and acknowledge the support that I have received along
the way on this journey.
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Josh
Ederington, for his invaluable guidance throughout my Ph.D. study. I am deeply grateful
for his continuous support and assistance, insightful comments, and patience at every
stage and could not have imagined having a beer advisor. I must thank Dr. Jenny Minier
for providing me the opportunity to study Economics at the University of Kentucky, for
being the mentor I wish to emulate, and for her unwavering support and belief in me.
My gratitude extends to Dr. Felipe Benguria for his helpful contributions; my work has
beneted from his individual expertise. I would also like to thank my external commiee
member, Dr. Mark Liu, and outside examiner, Dr. Kristine Hankins for their time and
valuable perspective.
Beyond my dissertation commiee, I am grateful to Dr. Ana Marı́a Herrera and Dr.
Steven Lugauer for their support and constructive feedback during the macro reading
group meetings. I wish to thank Dr. Chris Bollinger, Dr. Carlos Lamarche, Dr. William
Hoyt, Dr. James Ziliak, and Dr. Yoonbai Kim for their useful suggestions during the prac-
tice job market talk and encouragement throughout my time at the University of Ken-
tucky. anks should also go to Dr. Gail Hoyt, Dr. Darshak Patel, and Dr. Alejandro
Dellachiesa who have helped me nd my passion for teaching and grow as a teacher. And
I am immensely grateful to my rst-year cohort for their friendship and shared knowl-
edge, especially Sookti Chaudhary, Lauren DiRago-Duncan, Samuel Acheampong, and
Xiaozhou Ding.
Finally, I cannot begin to express my thanks to my husband, Seungki, who has always
stood beside me and never wavered in his support. Without his tremendous understand-
ing and encouragement, it would have been impossible for me to complete my Ph.D. de-
gree. My appreciation also goes out to my parents, Soon Lee and Chu Yop Han, and sister,
Hyoyoung Han, for their profound belief in me, unparalleled support, and patience. To
conclude, I would like to extend my gratitude to Dr. Jai Sheen Mah who has inuenced
me to embark on this journey.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
Chapter 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2 Determinants of Export Earnings Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Determinants of Export Earnings Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.1 Export Earnings Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.2 Export Concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.3 Durability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.4 Vertical Linkages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.5 Financial Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Aggregate Volatility: Bilateral and Industry Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.1 Bilateral Trade: Exporter-Importer-Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.2 Industry-Level Trade: Exporter-Industry-Year . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.2.1 Export concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.2.2 Durability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.2.3 Vertical linkages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.2.4 Financial vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5 Bilateral Industry-Level Trade: Exporter-Importer-Industry-Year . . . . . . 19
2.5.1 Export and Import Concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5.2 Durability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5.3 Vertical Linkages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.4 Financial Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.7 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.8 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Chapter 3 Do Trade Agreements Actually Reduce Trade Volatility? . . . . . . . . 30
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4 Empirics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4.1 Standard Measures of Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
iv
3.4.1.1 Denition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4.1.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.4.2 Detrended Measures of Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.4.2.1 Denition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.4.2.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.5 RTA Heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.7 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.8 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Chapter 4 Did Countries with Diversied Exports Fare Beer in the 2008 Global
Financial Crisis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2 A Cross-Country Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.2.1 Variables and Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.2.2 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2.3 OLS Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.3.1 Bilateral Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.3.2 Product-Level Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.4 Fixed Eects Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.4.1 Bilateral Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.4.2 Product-Level Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.6 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.7 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Appendix A: Variable Construction for Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Export Concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Durability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Vertical Linkages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
i. Indicator of downstream vertical linkages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
ii. Intermediate goods sector binary variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Industry Financial Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Trade Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Appendix B: Additional Tables for Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Appendix C: Alternative Volatility Measures for Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Vita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Professional Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Awards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
v
Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
vi
LIST OF TABLES
2.1 Summary Statistics - Response Variable (Export Earnings Volatility) . . . . . . 25
2.2 Summary Statistics - Explanatory Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3 Bilateral Trade (ijt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4 Industry-Level Trade (ikt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5 Bilateral Trade at the Industry Level (ijkt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1 Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) Ranking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 Summary Statistics - Standard Measures of Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 Eects of Trade Agreements on Export Earnings Volatility - Standard Measures 46
3.4 Summary Statistics - Detrended Measures of Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.5 Eects of Trade Agreements on Export Earnings Volatility - Detrended Measures 47
3.6 RTA Heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.1 ∆Exportsi, 2008-2009: OLS Results (Country-Level Trade) . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.2 Summary Statistics - Dependent Variable (Change in Exports 2008-09) . . . . . 65
4.3 Summary Statistics - Independent Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.4 ∆Exportsij , 2008-2009: Fixed Eects Results (Bilateral Trade) . . . . . . . . . 67
4.5 ∆Exportsik, 2008-2009: Fixed Eects Results (Product-Level Trade) . . . . . . 68
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 Average Export Earnings over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 Bilateral Trade - Average Export Earnings Volatility over Time . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Industry-Level Trade - Average Export Earnings Volatility over Time . . . . . 28
2.4 Bilateral Trade - Developed vs Developing Exporter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1 Average Volatility Over Time - Full Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2 Average Volatility Over Time - Restricted Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3 Average Log Export Earnings over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4 Average (Detrended) Volatility Over Time - Consistent Sample . . . . . . . . . 50
4.1 Trade and Domestic Private Credit over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 Trade over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3 Trade Finance over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
viii
Chapter 1 Introduction
Volatile export earnings raise uncertainty, which make it harder for rms to invest and
enter a new foreign market. In addition, the 2008 global nancial crisis was an unpleasant
experience for many exporters who were forced to cut production and employment. For
this reason, exporters’ desire for stability is seen in several cases. For instance, the exis-
tence of export cartels and the exception on the General Agreement on Taris and Trade
Article XX(h) regarding intergovernmental commodity agreements are partially justied
by their motivation for stability. Moreover, with increased trade openness, countries have
responded in several ways to insulate their economies from external shocks and instabil-
ity, including joining international trade institutions such as the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) and regional trade agreements. (See section 2.1 of Chapter 2 for more details.)
Given the discussion, trade volatility is something that people care about and the interest
lies in nding potential ways to acheive greater stability of trade. My dissertation studies
trade volatility, specically export earnings volatility, and is composed of three essays.
e rst essay (Chapter 2) studies the determinants of export earnings volatility. e
four determinants that I examine empirically are export concentration, durability, vertical
linkages, and nancial vulnerability. I use a panel of bilateral trade data at the SITC Rev.
1 four-digit industry level, consisting of 178 exporting countries, 194 importing countries,
and 590 industries for the period 1962–2011, and a xed eects model to look at the eects
of these four determinants on the two measures of export instability that I construct. In
the aggregate level, I nd that a country pair’s export earnings become more unstable
as they are concentrated on a small number of industries. Likewise, an exporter-industry
pair’s export revenues also become more volatile as they are concentrated on few destina-
tion markets. Export earnings of industries that produce durable goods and intermediate
inputs are found to be more volatile. Financially vulnerable industries that have a high
reliance on trade credit and low endowment of tangible assets are also found to have
more volatile export earnings in developing countries with weaker nancial institutions
and contractibility. ese industry results carry over into the disaggregated level. And
surprisingly, export diversication reduces export instability even at the disaggregated
level where individual risks are not diversied away, possibly suggesting the role of trade
institutions and infrastructure.
In the second essay, which is coauthored with Dr. Ederington and Dr. Minier, we study
the relationship between trade agreements and trade volatility. Increasing the stability
and predictability of trade ows is an oen-stated goal of both regional and multilateral
1
trade agreements. We examine if this goal is indeed met. First, we use a structual gravity
model to derive the equation for the variance of trade ows. We identify two potential
channels through which trade agreements may inuence bilateral trade volatility. One is a
decrease in trade volatility by reducing the variance of bilateral trade costs such as taris
and shipping costs. e other is a rise in trade volatility by increasing the covariance
of economic outcomes between the exporting and importing countries due to increased
connections and standardization of various policies. en we use a panel of bilateral
trade data at the SITC Rev. 1 four-digit industry level, covering 180 exporting countries,
194 importing countries, and 620 industries from 1964 to 2012, to empirically examine
the eects of regional trade agreement and GATT/WTO membership on export earnings
volatility, constructed in two dierent ways: standard and detrended measures. We nd
that becoming a member of the multilateral trading system (GATT/WTO) does reduce the
volatility of bilateral trade ows. However, joining a regional trade agreement would in
fact increase the instability of bilateral exports, which goes against its stated objective.
Interestingly, the positive relationship between the rise in volatility and regional trade
agreement membership is stronger as the economic integration grows deeper.
Finally, in the third essay, I focus on the trade collapse during the global nancial
crisis that outpaced the fall in production and empirically examine if countries with di-
versied exports experienced milder falls between 2008 and 2009. I use two datasets:
bilateral (exporter-importer) and product-level (exporter-product) data where product is
dened at the HS 2002 six-digit level and the bilateral trade data consist of 134 exporting
countries and 191 importing countries. I nd that country pairs whose bilateral exports
were concentrated on a small number of products experienced a greater export fall during
the global nancial crisis. Moreover, I look at the relationship between trade and trade
nance availability, measured by Berne Union members’ extension of short term insured
export credit, and nd that the relationship becomes stronger as product concentration
rises. Similarly, I nd in the product-level data that the relationship between trade and
nancial vulnerability, measured by external nance dependence, access to trade credit,
or asset tangibility using Compustat data, also grows as the market concentration index
increases, with the exception of trade credit access. ese results suggest that if trade
is concentrated on few products or markets, the countries become more susceptible to
trade nance shocks, and therefore, they are hit harder when there is a contraction in the
availability of trade nance during nancial shocks.
In what follows, Chapter 2 contains Essay 1, Chapter 3 contains Essay 2, and Chapter
4 contains Essay 3.
2
Chapter 2 Determinants of Export Earnings Volatility
2.1 Introduction
When the export revenues earned by exporting rms or countries experience unwanted,
frequent, or unpredictable changes, there is greater uncertainty and higher volatility in
export earnings. is in turn lowers the investment level of rms and deters them from
entering a new foreign market Handley and Limão (2015), Crowley et al. (2018). In ad-
dition, adverse shocks to export earnings force rms to cut production and employment,
which was the case during the global nancial crisis (Schwartz, 2009). It is not surprising
then to think that export instability is something that exporters want to avoid, and there
are several examples where this seems to be true. First, export cartels aecting foreign
markets are endorsed even though they would be illegal if put into eect domestically
Martyniszyn (2012). Considering that one of the goals of cartels is to stabilize prices as
stated in the OPEC’s website OPEC (nd) or news article on ebec Maple Syrup Produc-
ers, the OPEC of maple syrup (e Economist, 2015), the existence of export cartels is
partially justied by their motivation for stability. Furthermore, General Agreement on
Taris and Trade (GATT) Article XX(h) allows WTO members to deviate from the GATT
disciplines and undertake measures with the aim of meeting obligations under any in-
ternational commodity agreement whose objectives include stabilizing the prices of com-
modities GATT (1947). Second, as countries become more open to trade and exposed
to external shocks, they respond by increasing savings through the precautionary sav-
ing motive Ghosh and Ostry (1994) or government spending to provide social insurance
against external risk Rodrik (1998), or they choose to join international trade institutions
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and preferential trade arrangements to in-
sulate their economies from such instability Rose (2005), Manseld and Reinhardt (2008),
Ederington et al. (2021). Given this interest in shielding from volatility, it is important to
be informed about the factors that inuence export instability.
Literature suggests four determinants of export earnings volatility: export concentra-
tion or diversication (Coppock (1962), Massell (1964), MacBean (2011), Massell (1970),
Love (1986), Romeu and da Costa Neto (2011), Han (2021b)), durability (Erceg et al. (2008),
Engel and Wang (2011)), vertical linkages or trade in intermediate goods (Levchenko et al.
(2010), Bems et al. (2011)), and reliance on trade nance (Amiti and Weinstein (2011), Chor
and Manova (2012)). is paper is the rst to conduct a large-scale panel investigation of
these explanations using bilateral trade data at the industry level consisting of 178 export-
3
ing countries, 194 importing countries, and 590 SITC Rev. 1 four-digit industries from 1962
to 2011.
1
e three main ndings can be summarized as follows. First, aggregate export earn-
ings of an exporter-importer become more stable as they are dispersed over dierent in-
dustries. Likewise, the more diversied the export revenues of an exporter-industry are
across various partner countries, the less volatile they will be in the aggregate. Specif-
ically, an increase in the Herndahl-Hirschman industry concentration index (decrease
in diversication) by one standard deviation would raise export instability by 4.5–6 per-
cent of its median, and a rise in the Herndahl-Hirschman market concentration index by
one standard deviation leads to an increase in export earnings volatility by approximately
20–30 percent of its median.
Second, consistent with conventional wisdom, industries that produce durable goods
and intermediate inputs are found to be more volatile relative to nondurable and non-
intermediate goods industries at any level of aggregation. For instance, at the disaggre-
gated level, durable goods sectors are approximately 6 percentage points more volatile,
which is 12 percent of the median Instability 1. Similarly, at the disaggregated level, an
increase in the indicator of downstream vertical linkages by one standard deviation leads
to a rise in export instability by 3 percent of the median Instability 1. is is important
because durable goods constitute a considerable share of international trade, particularly
for developed countries. For example, half of U.S. exports in 2011 were in durable goods.
It may also be of relevance to developing countries in the future as their incomes grow
and their production expands to include more durable goods. Moreover, the increased
interconnectedness of countries and industries due to global supply chains has raised
concerns about vulnerability to external shocks, and the fact that cross-border vertical
linkages contributes to trade volatility may be of great interest.
ird, although nancially vulnerable industries have experienced greater trade re-
ductions during the global nancial crisis Chor and Manova (2012), their export earnings
do not seem to be more volatile for developed countries. However, a sector’s reliance on
trade credit and endowment of tangible assets do have an inuence on the export instabil-
ity of developing countries. is is because trade credit and tangible assets maer more
in developing countries which have less developed nancial markets and weak nancial
contractibility. Since they have weaker nancial institutions, they are more reliant on the
1
A related paper on the sources of trade volatility is Benne et al. (2016), which decomposes trade growth
volatility into six components: a common (αt), country-specic (αit), partner (αjt), sectoral (αkt), resis-
tance (αijt), and error term (εijkt). Using bilateral trade ows for four broad sectors, the paper nds that
the common factors play a dominant role in explaining the aggregate volatility of trade ows for the period
1990–2011.
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trade credit from suppliers/buyers as a substitute for formal bank loans Fisman and Love
(2003). Moreover, due to weak nancial contractibility, a higher proportion of hard assets
is required to secure external nance Braun (2005).
Most of the related literature falls into one of two categories. One focuses on the recent
global recession and conducts an event study, coming up with various explanations for
the Great Trade Collapse Levchenko et al. (2010), Chor and Manova (2012), Romeu and
da Costa Neto (2011), Han (2021b). e Great Trade Collapse refers to the sudden, severe,
and synchronized drop in world trade between the third quarter of 2008 and the second
quarter of 2009 (Baldwin, 2009). World merchandise exports fell from 16,170 billion U.S.
dollars in 2008 to 12,563 billion U.S. dollars in 2009 WTO (nd), a 22.3% drop compared to
the 5.2% reduction in world GDP from 63,676 to 60,396 billion U.S. dollars during the same
period World Bank (2021a). Many studies have strived to explain the larger fall in world
trade relative to that in world production. Explanations include the plunge in demand
for postponable durable goods which consist a large share of trade, global supply chains,
and a decrease in trade nance. is paper is dierent in that each of these factors are
examined to see if they also explain export earnings volatility in other periods and not
just the global recession of 2008–2009.
e other is an older literature analyzing the eects of export concentration on export
instability using cross sectional (Coppock (1962), Massell (1964), MacBean (2011), Massell
(1970)) or time series (Love (1986)) data. Commodity concentration was viewed as a major
factor contributing to the export earnings volatility of developing countries whose exports
were predominantly focused on primary products. is was of interest to economists
and policymakers as export instability was regarded to impede the economic growth of
developing countries. However, the results of many empirical studies lacked evidence in
support of a causal relationship between commodity concentration and export instability,
partially due to data limitations. is paper addresses this constraint by using an extensive
panel of bilateral trade data disaggregated at the four-digit SITC level. e use of such
data also enables the inclusion of a set of xed eects to deal with the endogeneity of
export concentration. Fixed eects can absorb any unobserved country characteristics
that are both correlated with export concentration and instability and bias the coecient
estimates.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the determinants
of export earnings volatility. Section 2.3 discusses the data along with stylized facts. e
subsequent two sections present the empirical model as well as regression results: section
2.4 examines the eects on aggregate volatility, using either bilateral (exporter-importer-
year) or industry-level (exporter-industry-year) trade data, and section 2.5 studies the
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eects on volatility using the most disaggregated bilateral trade data at the industry level
(exporter-importer-industry-year). Finally, section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Determinants of Export Earnings Volatility
e four main determinants of export earnings volatility suggested by the literature are
durability, vertical linkages, nancial vulnerability, and export concentration. e rst
three are motivated from Levchenko et al. (2010), which illustrates three potential expla-
nations in the literature for the greater fall in trade relative to that in production during the
global nancial crisis: compositional eects, vertical linkages, and trade credit.
2
e last
determinant, export concentration, comes from an older literature on export instability.
is section presents each of the determinants of export earnings volatility in detail.
First, export revenues in industries producing durable goods may be more volatile than
those in nondurable goods sectors because spending on durable goods (e.g., furniture,
appliances, and automobiles) is more strongly aected by business cycles compared to
that in nondurable goods (e.g., food and clothing) and services. For example, consumers
will wait a lile longer to replace their cars and computers during a recession, but they
still have to continue purchasing groceries or spending on services such as utilities and
health care. In fact, more than half of the fall in U.S. GDP during the Great Recession
was a result of the drop in broadly dened durable spending
3
(Berger and Vavra, 2014).
is translated into a disproportionately larger decline in trade relative to GDP given the
importance of durables in trade. For instance, approximately three quarters of U.S. non-
fuel trade ows consist of capital goods and consumer durables while under a h of U.S.
production is in these investment goods
4
Erceg et al. (2008). Erceg et al. (2008) and Engel
and Wang (2011) have proposed models incorporating this compositional dierence trying
to match the larger movements in trade seen in data. Since part of trade volatility stems
from the volatile nature of expenditures on durable goods which make up a signicant
share of trade, durable goods sectors may demonstrate greater volatility in export earnings
compared to nondurable goods sectors.
Second, vertical linkages or intermediate goods trade is commonly associated with
the increase in exposure to external shocks, which could possibly lead to greater trade
volatility. Particularly, much media aention has been paid to the role of vertical linkages
2
Levchenko et al. (2010) nds evidence for the rst two explanations using U.S. import and export data
disaggregated at the six-digit NAICS level (about 450 sectors). e trade collapse was greater in sectors
that experienced larger drops in domestic output (durable goods) and those used as intermediate inputs,
but trade credit did not play a signicant role.
3
Purchases of consumer durables and residential investments
4
Investment goods = capital goods (producer durables) + consumer durables
6
in the great trade collapse during the global recession of 2008–2009 Bems et al. (2009), Yi
(2009). e underlying concern is that the supply chain of a good stretches across multi-
ple countries, increasing interdependence of production processes and exposure to shocks
that occur to supply chain participants; thus, facilitating the propagation of shocks. e
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates this well. Government containment policies
aimed at slowing the spread of the disease have led to the reduction or suspension of pro-
duction in manufacturing sectors around the world, making it harder or more costly to
obtain intermediate inputs from one another (Baldwin and Freeman, 2020). For instance,
due to China’s supply side disruption, automobile manufacturers in South Korea were
forced to halt production for a couple of days in February 2020 because they were not
able to acquire the necessary parts (Shin, 2020). In this regard, vertical linkages are con-
ventionally viewed as having led to the Great Trade Collapse. However, results of related
empirical studies have been mixed. Levchenko et al. (2010) nds that sectors used as in-
termediate inputs experienced larger drops in trade during the global nancial crisis. On
the other hand, Bems et al. (2011) nds that intermediate goods contracted less than nal
goods during the same period. is paper aempts to uncover the relationship between
vertical linkages and export instability and examine if the former contributes to the laer.
ird, export earnings in industries that are more reliant on trade nance
5
may be
more volatile as their performance depends on the access to external nance. Similarly,
Amiti and Weinstein (2011) nds that exporting rms are more susceptible to nancial
shocks than nonexporting rms due to their reliance on trade nance. Chor and Manova
(2012) presents three reasons why credit availability maers more for exporting rms.
First, they have to incur trade costs, including policy barriers and transportation costs,
as well as additional upfront sunk and xed costs such as learning about new foreign
markets, complying with new regulations, customizing products, and establishing for-
eign distribution networks. Second, because international transactions take, on average,
30 to 90 days longer, there is a wider gap between the time exporters need to cover pro-
duction costs and the time they receive payment for the delivery of goods, making them
more dependent on working capital. ird, due to longer time lags and increased risk of
non-payment, they need additional trade credit insurance. e need for outside capital
may also dier across sectors. Industries that are nancially vulnerable may be hit harder
by nancial shocks. Using the sector-level U.S. import and export data aggregated across
5
Trade credit and trade nance are occasionally used interchangeably. In Amiti and Weinstein (2011), trade
credit is the item that is recorded under accounts receivable of a rm’s balance sheet when an order for a
good or service is received but payment is expected in the future. e order may be placed by a foreign
purchaser, but it could also be put in by a domestic buyer in which case it has nothing to do with interna-
tional trade. Trade nance, on the other hand, refers to export working-capital loans and other means to
nance international trade credits recorded on an exporting rm’s balance sheet.
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trading partners, Levchenko et al. (2010) nds no support that sectors using or oering
trade credit more intensively experienced larger percentage reductions in trade between
2008 and 2009. However, using U.S. import data disaggregated not only by industry but
also by partner country, Chor and Manova (2012) shows that countries with tighter credit
conditions (higher interbank lending rates) exported relatively less to the U.S. in sectors
that are nancially vulnerable—sectors that are reliant on external nance, have restricted
access to trade credit from suppliers or buyers, or have few physical assets that can serve
as collateral when securing a loan. Along these lines, it may be that these nacially vul-
nerable industries also have more volatile export earnings in general.
Lastly, export concentration is included as a variable of interest to explain the instabil-
ity of export earnings in numerous cross-country studies (Coppock (1962), Massell (1964),
MacBean (2011), Massell (1970)) due to the conventional wisdom that the more spread out
a country’s export revenues are across dissimilar products inuenced by dierent market
forces, the less correlated they will be. In addition, a country whose export earnings are
dispersed over a larger number of partners will depend less on the economic conditions of
a single or few destination countries. However, contrary to the conventional view, there
is lack of evidence in cross-sectional analyses associating the concentration of exports
6
with the indices of export instability. In fact, geographic concentration is even found to
be negatively related to export instability. In contrast to these unexpected results, Love
(1986) nds that there is widespread evidence of a statistically signicant and positive
relationship between commodity concentration and export instability at the level of the
individual country using a time series approach.
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In a more recent study by Romeu and
da Costa Neto (2011), the eect of export diversication on trade during the global -
nancial crisis is examined, using 14 Latin American countries’ quarterly exports at the
HS two-digit level to 16 destination countries whose trade comprises over 90 percent of
world trade. e paper measures export concentration using the Herndahl index by
three dierent dimensions: HS two-digit industries, trading partners, and HS four-digit
products within each two-digit sector. It nds that increasing export diversication by
industry and product reduces the quarterly decline in exports, whereas the spread of ex-
port values across dierent trading partners does not have a signicant eect. Following
these papers, it seems reasonable to examine the eects of export concentration on export
earnings volatility using a panel of bilateral industry-level trade data.
6
e more concentrated exports are on few products or markets, the less diversied.
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Annual export ows (Trade volume) from reporter i to partner j in current U.S. dollars
both at the country and SITC Rev. 1 four-digit industry (k) level are from the UN Com-
trade Database for the period 1962–2015. e FTA dummy variable is calculated using the
NSF-Kellogg Institute Economic Integration Agreements (EIA) Database, and the year of
GATT/WTO membership needed for the GATT/WTO dummy variable comes from Tomz
et al. (2007).
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(See Appendix A for how these dummy variables are dened.) As for the
response variable and explanatory variables of interest, the data sources, measures, and
stylized facts are provided in the following subsections.
e resulting dataset is an unbalanced panel that covers 178 exporting countries (re-
porters), 194 importing countries (partners), 590 SITC four-digit industries, and spans 50
years from 1962
9
to 2011 (export values of 1962–2015 are used to compute export earn-
ings volatility measures of 1962–2011). e data is comprehensive containing countries
with dierent levels of development, goods-producing industries ranging from primary
commodities to manufactured goods, as well as a long period of time. is rich dataset
permits the inclusion of various xed eects to control for possible unobservables and
treat omied variable bias.
2.3.1 Export Earnings Volatility
Because there are numerous ways of constructing export instability indices, two measures
are computed here as a robustness check using the export values from UN Comtrade:
Instability 1 and 2. e correlation coecient between the two is about 0.4, implying that
they have a moderate positive linear relationship. Both are computed over rolling ve-
year periods, and thus the export instability indicators have a value in each year allowing
for the study of year-to-year volatility. For example, Instability 1 and 2 of year 2001 would
use export values of the ve-year period 2001–2005. e dierence is that Instability 1
captures short run uctuations in export earnings around the ve-year moving average,
while Instability 2 does so around the exponential trend.
8
In addition to formal members, Tomz et al. (2007) classies colonies, de facto members, and provisional
members as having GATT membership since they shared the major rights and obligations of the agreement.
When including these nonmember participants, Tomz et al. (2007) shows that GATT/WTO members have
in fact experienced growth in trade unlike the lile evidence found in Rose (2004), which only treats formal
members introduced in the World Trade Organization website as having GATT/WTO membership.
9
e observations of year 1962 are dropped in the regression analysis due to lagged explanatory variables
(export concentration indices).
9







where yt is the observation of export earnings, ȳ is the ve-year mean export revenue,
and T = 5. is is the average size of deviations of export earnings from the ve-year
moving average relative to the ve-year mean.
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For instance, Instability 1 whose value
is 40 means the standard deviation over the ve-year period is 40 percent of the ve-year
mean.
Likewise, Instability 2 is the average magnitude of deviations of export revenues from
the exponential trend relative to the ve-year average trend. e choice of exponential
trend is based on the observation of export series of a typical exporter-importer (ij) and
exporter-industry (ik) as shown in Figure 2.1. As might be suggested from the time plots,
the exponential trend results in the highest goodness of t when running xed eects
regressions on a deterministic trend (linear, quadratic, and exponential).
12
A couple of
steps are taken to calculate Instability 2. First, the following is estimated by OLS for each
h ∈ {ij, ik, ijk}:
Ln(yht) = β0 + β1t+ εht,
10
Massell (1964) and Wong (1986) use the trend-corrected coecient of variation to compute the index of







where yt is the observed export value, ŷt is the ed value aer estimating a linear time trend, and ȳ is the
mean of the export values. is index shares similarities with both Instability 1 and 2 used in this paper.
e main dierence is that the index is computed over the entire time period for each country to be used
in a cross-sectional analysis while in this paper the measures are computed over rolling ve-year periods,
yielding a value for each year and allowing a panel analysis. Although Instability 2 is also computed over
ve-year periods, the ed export values are obtained aer estimating the exponential trend just once.
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Similarly, MacBean (2011) uses an export instability index measured as the average percentage deviation
of the export values from the ve-year moving average centered on the middle year.
12
is is also the deterministic trend adopted in Massell (1970) under the justication that countries plan us-
ing growth rates rather than absolute changes, making it relevant to look at deviations from an exponential
growth path. e use of a deterministic trend as opposed to a stochastic one is based on the spectrum den-
sity of export series, which is oen dominated by low-frequency variations Cariolle and Goujon (2015).
As a robustness check, the trend values are obtained from a global mixed trend that includes a lagged
dependent variable (stochastic component) as the following:
Ln(Export earningsht) = β0 + β1t+ β2Export earningsh,t−1 + εht,
where h ∈ {ij, ik, ijk} and εht ∼ N(0, σ2). e resulting export earnings volatility measure is referred
to as Instability 3. e correlation coecients of Instability 3 with the other two measures are 0.429 and
0.832, respectively. Regression results using Instability 3 as an alternative measure of export instability
are reported in Table A5 of Appendix B, and the main results are unchanged.
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where yht is the observed export value, t is a linear trend, and εht is a zero mean error
term. e predicted log export value is l̂n(y) = β̂0 + β̂1t, where the hat (ˆ) indicates
that the value is estimated. To obtain trend values of y rather than ln(y) and to correct
for systematically underestimating the expected value of y, an expression of the standard
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where the denominator is the average of trend values over the ve-year period. As an
example, Instability 2 with a value of 60 implies that the average size of deviations of
export earnings from the exponential trend is 60 percent of the ve-year average trend.
e dataset is restricted to observations for which the export values exceed 500 U.S.
dollars
13
in each of the 5 years over which Instability 1 and 2 are computed. at is, only
stable trade relationships between country pairs and established industries in terms of
trade that last at least ve years are analyzed. is intentional focus on volatility in the
intensive margin of trade may bias the sample towards developed countries, but similar
results are found when restricting the sample to non-high-income economies, with the
exception of the eects of nancial vulnerability on export instability (see sections 2.4.2.4
and 2.5.4). Besides, focusing on the intensive margin spares the trouble of dealing with the
complications of zero-trade ows. Of course, studying volatility in the extensive margin
of trade would also be important and interesting, but it is le for future research.
Figure 2.2 and 2.3 plots average values of Instability 1 and 2 over 1962–2011 for the
typical exporter-importer (ij) and exporter-industry (ik) respectively. Panel (a) includes
all observations, whereas panel (b) is restricted to exporter-importer (exporter-industry)
pairs that have observations throughout the whole sample period. ere are a couple of
things to note from these gures. To begin with, the average Instability 2 is higher than
the average Instability 1. is is because Instability 2 detrends the export series once for
each panel variable (exporter-importer, exporter-industry, or exporter-importer-industry)
to compute the trend values, and with panel variables where no single exponential trend
ts, the index tends to overstate the amount of short-run uctuations.
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Table 2.1 presents
summary statistics for the export instability measures and conrms this fact—Instability
2 has a higher mean and median. For instance, at the most disaggregated level (ijkt), the
13
In the bilateral industry-level trade data, the minimum export value reported for an exporter-importer-
industry prior to 2000 is 501 U.S. dollars. For consistency, this threshold value is applied to all years and
also in the aggregate data.
14
For this reason, MacBean (2011) prefers the ve-year moving average to the widely used linear time trend.
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mean Instability 1 is 57 while the mean Instability 2 is higher at 83. In other words, the
average size of deviations from the ve-year moving average is 57 percent of the ve-year
mean while the average magnitude of deviations from the exponential trend is 83 percent
of the ve-year average trend. In addition, Instability 2 is approximately three to four
times more volatile (the standard deviation is three to four times larger) than Instability 1.
e instability measures also seem to be correlated with global business cycles, showing
spikes in times of recessions, e.g., the 1970s energy crisis and the global nancial crisis,
which is another reason to include time xed eects in estimation. Lastly, compared
to the full sample in panel (a), the average export earnings volatility measures of the
consistent sample appear to gradually decline, though Instability 2 seems to pick up as it
includes years aected by the recent global recession. is implies that trade volatility
decreases over time for the most stable trade relationships and exporting industries that
have survived over the entire period, but the addition of new markets and products keeps
average export instability from falling in the full sample.
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Figure 2.4 compares the average values of export earnings volatility between dif-
ferent groups of countries by level of development: high-income (developed) vs non-
high-income (developing) exporters.
16
e gure shows that on average, export revenues




Two dimensions of export concentration are measured by the Herndahl-Hirschman con-
centration index (HHI) using the export values obtained from UN Comtrade. One is an
exporter-importer’s spread of export values across industries (HHI industry), and the other
is an exporter-industry’s spread of export values across trading partners (HHImarket). See
Appendix A for more details.
Table 2.2 reports the summary statistics for explanatory variables. e mean values
of HHI industry and HHImarket are 0.348 and 0.414, respectively, and the indices range
from 0 (perfect diversication) to 1 (perfect concentration). For example, U.S.-Canada’s
HHI industry in 2011 was close to 0 at 0.014, suggesting the country pair’s export values are
diversied across industries. In fact, the number of U.S. industries that export to Canada
15
e contrast between the full and consistent sample is more evident in Ederington et al. (2021).
16
e division of countries (used interchangeably with economies) into income groups comes from
the World Bank website: https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/
articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups
17
In addition, exports owing to non-high-income economies usually exhibit higher volatility compared to
those owing to high-income economies.
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surged from 536 in 1988 to 588 in 1989, which is the year the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement entered into force, and has stayed prey much stable. Considering there are
625 potential SITC Rev.1 four-digit industries (590 in the sample), most of the industries
in the U.S. export to Canada, which is why the export values are spread out across many
industries contributing to the low HHI industry. On the other hand, Malawi-Romania’s
HHI industry in 2011 was 1 because only one industry (“tobacco, unmanufactured and
scrap”) in Malawi exported to Romania. As a maer of fact, Malawian exports in 2011 to
10 partner countries, including Romania, were all from this one industry. Accordingly,
Malawi’s HHI industry with these 10 countries was 1. Similarly, the “passenger motor car
(other than buses)” industry in the U.S. exported to 180 countries in 2011, resulting in
a relatively low HHImarket of 0.108 for U.S.-“passenger motor cars (other than buses)”.
However, the “electric energy” industry of the U.S. has only exported to one trading part-
ner, Canada, since 1990, and because the industry’s exports have been concentrated on
just one market, the HHImarket has also been 1 for U.S.-“electric energy”.
2.3.3 Durability
e division of exports into categories of durable and nondurable goods comes from Engel
and Wang (2011). Based on this classication, the Durability binary variable is created
which assumes the value 1 if the sector produces durable goods and 0 otherwise. Among
the 590 four-digit industries in the sample, 35.4 percent are durable goods sectors. See
Appendix A for the list of these industries.
2.3.4 Vertical Linkages
Two measures of vertical linkages are constructed. One is the indicator of Downstream
vertical linkages adopted from Levchenko et al. (2010) but using the Direct Requirements
Table of 2007 prepared by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
18
is indicator represents
the intensity with which a commodity is used as an intermediate input by other indus-
tries, and lies between 0 and 100—the closer to 100, the higher the intensity.
19
e other is
a binary variable given a value of 1 if the industry produces intermediate inputs; 0 other-
wise. e UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC) are used to classify intermediate goods,
and out of the 590 four-digit industries in the sample, 61.2 percent are intermediate goods
18
e indicator of downstream vertical linkages in Levchenko et al. (2010) is based on the 2002 benchmark
version of the detailed U.S. I-O matrix.
19
e indicator used in Levchenko et al. (2010) ranges from 0 to 1. However, due to the extremely small
values, I have rescaled the indicator to range from 0 to 100, e.g., the mean value of 0.00184 has been
rescaled to 0.184. Even then, the values are quite small.
13
sectors. e correlation coecient between the two measures is about 0.4.
20
See Appendix
A for more details.
2.3.5 Financial Vulnerability
Following Chor and Manova (2012), three nancial vulnerability measures are calculated
using data items obtained from Compustat on all publicly-held rms in North America:
External nance dependence, Trade credit reliance, and Asset tangibility.21 Industries are
considered nancially vulnerable when they are highly dependent on external nance,
highly reliant on trade credit, or have a low share of hard assets such as real estate, ma-
chinery, and plant, which can serve as collateral to obtain external nance and provide
protection to the supplier of funds. e correlation coecients between the three mea-
sures are reported in Table A1 of Appendix B. For the construction of these variables, see
Appendix A.
2.4 Aggregate Volatility: Bilateral and Industry Level
ree levels of analysis are examined in this paper: bilateral trade (exporter-importer-
year), industry-level trade (exporter-industry-year), and bilateral trade at the industry
level (exporter-importer-industry-year). e rst two corresponds to the aggregate level
and the third to the disaggregated level. e reason for the three levels is because dierent
economic agents may be interested in dierent levels of volatility. For instance, within
the aggregate level, governments may care about the volatility of bilateral trade while
producers may be more interested in trade volatility at the industry level. In addition,
the eects on export instability may be dierent between the aggregate versus the dis-
aggregated level. is section studies the eects of the determinants on export earnings
volatility in the aggregate using either bilateral trade or industry-level trade data.
2.4.1 Bilateral Trade: Exporter-Importer-Year
e unit of observation in the bilateral trade data is an exporter-importer-year (ijt) triplet.
Industry variation is not used here yet and will be introduced later when dealing with
20
It is assumed that an industry’s average usage as an intermediate input is determined technologically, and
the indicator of downstream vertical linkages constructed using U.S. data is representative of that in other
countries. is strong assumption is justied by the moderate and positive correlation coecient between
the indicator and the binary variable which is created using global categories of intermediate goods.
21
In lieu of the ow measures used in Chor and Manova (2012), the corresponding stock measures of external
nance dependence and trade credit reliance are used as in Fisman and Love (2003). is is because the
stock measures are stabler over the sample period, justifying the use of time-invariant industry nancial
vulnerability variables.
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industry-level data. e regression equation that is estimated is the following:
Export earnings volatilityijt = β0 + β1HHI
industry
ij(t−1) + β2FTAijt + β3GATT/WTOijt
+ β4Trade volumeijt + αij + αit + αjt + αt + εijt, (1)
where i is the exporter, j is the importer or destination market, and t is the year. Ex-
port earnings volatility refers to either Instability 1 or 2. e variable of interest is export
concentration measured by the Herndahl-Hirschman concentration index (HHI) whose
value lies between 0 and 1. For each exporter-importer (ij), HHI industryijt represents the
spread of export values in year t across dierent industries. e higher the concentration
index, the less diversied the exports. Since there is no industry variation, this is the only
determinant of export instability to be investigated here. Export concentration is lagged
one year to reduce the contemporaneous correlation between the concentration index and
the error term. For example, negative bilateral shocks (εijt) may make bilateral trade ows
more volatile and knock out trade in smaller industries, raising HHI industry. Using past
values for export concentration lessens its correlation with the negative bilateral shocks in
the current year. e level of trade integration between the exporter and importer is con-
trolled for using the FTA and GATT/WTO dummy variables. Each takes on the value 1 if
the two countries are members of a free trade agreement or the GATT/WTO multilateral
system, respectively. In addition, trade volume is included to control for infrastructure
and institutions that facilitate trade such as ports, roads, telecommunications, customs,
and regulations.
22
Finally, xed eects are included to control for observed characteris-
tics of countries (and country pairs) as well as address the issue of endogeneity of export
concentration. For instance, developed countries tend to have a more diversied export
basket and at the same time exhibit lower trade volatility for reasons unobserved to the
researcher, and including time-varying country-year xed eects addresses the problem
of omiing these unobserved country characteristics. e country-pair eects (αij) cap-
ture the time-invariant bilateral distance between exporter i and importer j such as the
geographic distance and whether they share a common language or border.
23
Exporter-
year (αit) and importer-year (αjt) eects capture time-varying country charateristics such
as country size, population, level of income, macro policies, and exchange rate volatility.
Year (αt) eects absorb global shocks common to all countries.
22
Bougheas et al. (1999) nds that the stock of infrastructure lowers transport costs which in turn increases
the volume of trade. Levchenko (2007) nds that the dierences in the quality of institutions across coun-
tries and dependence on institutions across industries are an important determinant of trade ows.
23
Directional country-pair xed eects are used in the analysis. e main results are unchanged when using
symmetric pair eects.
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e expected sign on the HHI industry estimated coecient is positive. If a country
pair’s exports are diversied (low HHI) across various industries, the variability of export
earnings in one industry could be oset by that in another, contributing to lower insta-
bility of export earnings in the aggregate. On the other hand, the expected sign on the
estimated coecients of the trade agreement dummy variables is negative since signing
a free trade agreement or trading within the WTO framework reduces uncertainty and
promotes predictability in the trade environment, resulting in more stable export rev-
enues.
24
Trade volume is expected to be negatively correlated with export instability since
countries that trade a lot have beer infrastructure or institutions for trade, providing en-
hanced predictability, consistency, and protection against volatility. In addition, exporting
to countries that lack such infrastructure may be costly and exporters may choose to make
fewer and larger shipments causing trade to be more lumpy and volatile.
e results are reported in Table 2.3. Standard errors are two-way clustered by ex-
porter and importer to account for within-cluster error correlation.
25
Consistent with
expectations, the estimated coecient on HHI industry suggests that on average, an in-
crease in the concentration index by 1 from a perfectly diversied export basket (0) to a
perfectly concentrated one (1) results in a 5.675 percentage point increase in Instability
1 and 11.441 percentage point increase in Instability 2, holding other variables constant.
More realistically, a rise in the HHI by one standard deviation (0.302) leads to an increase
in Instability 1 by 1.714 percentage points (median Instability 1 is 38.211%) and Instabil-
ity 2 by 3.455 percentage points (median Instability 2 is 57.151%). erefore, diversifying
bilateral exports across dierent industries reduces trade volatility in the aggregate.
e FTA estimated coecient is not statistically signicant and the sign is positive.
is is against expectation, but Ederington et al. (2021) identies a channel through which
trade agreements may result in increased volatility of bilateral exports: by raising the
covariance in economic outcomes between trading partners. e GATT/WTO dummy
variable is also insignicant and one of the two trade volume estimated coecients is
statistically signicant and negative as expected.
2.4.2 Industry-Level Trade: Exporter-Industry-Year
In the industry-level trade data, each unit of observation is an exporter-industry-year (ikt)
triplet. e regressors vary across industries allowing the use of industry variation. e
24
In Ederington et al. (2021), we study the relationship between trade agreements and trade volatility in
more detail.
25
Clustering by country pair yields similar results. e only dierence is that one of the FTA coecients
becomes statistically signicant at the 5% signicance level.
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following is the regression equation that is estimated:
Export earnings volatilityikt = β0 + β1HHI
market
ik(t−1) + β2Durabilityk
+ β3Vertical linkagesk + β4Financial vulnerabilityk
+ β5Trade volumeikt + αi + αit + αt + εikt, (2)
where i is the exporter, k is the industry, and t is the year. e variables of interest are
export concentration of markets, durability, vertical linkages, and nancial vulnerability,
which are discussed in more detail in turn. As in the previous section, trade volume is con-
trolled for to account for the presence of trade-facilitating infrastructure and institutions
that provide beer predictability and consistency. In addition, time-invariant exporter
eects (αi), time-varying exporter-year eects (αit), and year eects (αt) are included. In
addition to the observed characteristics of the exporting country, the xed eects capture
all the unobservables that are correlated with export concentration and volatility. E.g.,
richer countries tend to have lower export concentration indices and more stable export
earnings for unobserved reasons. e results are reported in Table 2.4, and standard errors
are two-way clustered by exporter and industry to control for within-cluster correlation
of the error.
2.4.2.1 Export concentration
A dierent dimension of export concentration/diversication is examined here: HHImarketikt ,
which measures the dispersion of export values of each exporter-industry (ik) across dif-
ferent partner countries or destination markets in year t and ranges between 0 (perfectly
diversied) and 1 (perfectly concentrated). Export concentration is lagged one period
to reduce the contemporaneous correlation with the error term. For instance, negative
shocks in a country’s industry (εikt) may raise the volatility of its export revenues and
force small partner countries to drop out of the trade relationship resulting in a higher
HHImarket. e estimated coecient on HHImarket is expected to be negative. A high
concentration index implies that the export revenues are concentrated in few destination
markets, exposing the exporter-industry (ik) to the ups and downs of a handful of markets.
However, as the concentration index approaches 0 and exports are spread out among a
larger number of markets, the uctuations of individual markets are balanced out and ex-
port earnings in the aggregate become less volatile. Consistent with the expectation, the
estimated coecient ofHHImarket implies that on average, a rise in the index by 1 (going
from perfect diversication to perfect concentration) raises Instability 1 by 40 percentage
points, holding all else constant (refer to the rst three columns of Table 2.4). Put dier-
ently, a standard deviation (0.284) increase in HHI raises Instability 1 by approximately 11
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percentage points (median Instability 1 is 36.332%). e eect of HHI on Instability 2 is
similar.
2.4.2.2 Durability
e durability of an industry is represented by a binary variable which is equal to 1 if
the sector is a durables sector and 0 otherwise. Since spending on durable goods is more
volatile than expenditures on nondurables or services, the hypothesis is that the durable
goods sectors demonstrate higher export instability compared to the nondurables sectors.
erefore, the expected sign on the estimated coecient of the Durable dummy variable
is positive. Consistent with the hypothesis, on average, exports in durables sectors are 3–
4 percentage points more volatile relative to those in nondurables sectors, holding other
variables constant (refer to Table 2.4). e size and signicance of the coecient is stable
regardless of which measure of export earnings volatility, vertical linkages, and nancial
vulnerability is used.
2.4.2.3 Vertical linkages
Vertical linkages refer to either Downstream vertical linkages or the Intermediate goods
sector dummy variable. e former is an indicator of the average usage of a commod-
ity/industry as an intermediate input by other downstream industries and ranges between
0 and 100–the closer to 100, the higher the usage. e laer is a dummy variable given
a value of 1 if the industry is an intermediate goods industry; 0 otherwise. Conventional
wisdom says cross-border vertical linkages, or international trade in intermediate goods,
have increased the interconnectedness of countries and industries and have exposed them
to external shocks. is is viewed to have contributed to the larger decline in trade dur-
ing the Great Recession of 2008–2009. However, results of empirical studies on the role
of vertical linkages during the global recession have been mixed. is paper nds that on
average, Instability 1 increases by approximately 2 percentage points as the indicator of
Downstream vertical linkages rises by one standard deviation (0.199), ceteris paribus (refer
to the rst three columns of Table 2.4). Similarly, on average, intermediate goods sectors
exhibit 2–3 percentage points higher export instability compared to non-intermediate
goods sectors, holding other variables constant (refer to Table A2 of Appendix B). Re-
gardless of which vertical linkages measure is used, the estimated coecient is positive
and statistically signicant. is result that global supply chains may contribute to trade
volatility is in line with Bems et al. (2009), Yi (2009), and Levchenko et al. (2010).
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2.4.2.4 Financial vulnerability
Financial vulnerability refers to one of the three measures: External nance dependence,
Trade credit reliance, or Asset tangibility. (See Appendix A for denitions.) e three mea-
sures are assumed to vary across industries due to technological reasons, but the values of
these sector characteristics are assumed to be relatively stable across countries. Since the
U.S. has one of the most developed nancial systems, an industry’s technological demand
for credit can be identied using U.S. data and is assumed to carry over to other countries
Rajan and Zingales (1998), Fisman and Love (2003), Braun (2005), Chor and Manova (2012).
Financially vulnerable industries are expected to have more volatile export earnings since
their steady export performance depends on the stability of their access to nance. ere-
fore, the expected sign of the estimated coecient of the rst two measures is positive and
that of the third is negative. at is, industries that are highly dependent on external -
nance or trade credit and those with a low share of tangible assets are expected to have
more unstable export revenues.
Surprisingly, all three measures of nancial vulnerability are statistically insignicant
(refer to Table 2.4). When the sample is restricted to developing countries, however, for
which nancial constraints would play a more important role, Trade credit reliance and
Asset tangibility become statistically signicant. (See Table A3 of Appendix B.) As the
industry’s reliance on trade credit grows stronger by one standard deviation (0.022) for
developing countries, export instability increases by 2–3 percent of its median. Likewise,
as the industry’s share of tangible assets increases in developing countries, their ability
to pledge collateral when securing external nance is also enhanced, and as a result, ex-
port instability decreases by 3–5 percent of its median. Trade credit and tangible assets
are particularly important for developing countries because they have weaker nancial
institutions and contractibility. For this reason, they are more reliant on an alternative
source of funds in the form of trade credit from suppliers Fisman and Love (2003) and are
required to have a higher proportion of hard assets to be able to secure external nance
Braun (2005).
2.5 Bilateral Industry-Level Trade: Exporter-Importer-Industry-Year
e previous section looks at aggregate export earnings volatility of an exporter-importer
(ij) aggregated across industries (section 2.4.1) or exporter-industry (ik) aggregated over
partners (section 2.4.2). is section examines volatility at the disaggregated level. Each
observation corresponds to an exporter-importer-industry-year (ijkt) and the following
regression equation is estimated which includes all the variables that have been discussed
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so far and an additional concentration variable (to be explained in the following subsec-
tion):







+ β4Durabilityk + β5Vertical linkagesk + β6Financial vul.k
+ β7FTAijt + β8GATT/WTOijt + β9Trade volumeijkt
+ αij + αit + αjt + αt + εijkt, (3)
where i is the exporter, j is the importer, k is the industry, and t is the year. As before, the
trade agreement dummy variables (FTA, GATT/WTO)26 and trade volume are controlled
for and country-pair (αij), country-year (αit, αjt), and year eects (αt) are included. e
regression results are found in Table 2.5, and standard errors are three-way clustered by
exporter, importer, and industry.
2.5.1 Export and Import Concentration
At this level of data, bothHHI industryijt andHHI
market
ikt are included, each evaluating a dif-
ferent dimension of export concentration/diversication: the former is across industries
for each exporter-importer (ij) in a specic year and the laer is across partner countries
for each exporter-industry (ik) in year t. In addition, a third measure of concentration
is included: HHImarketjkt , which represents import concentration of an importer-industry
(jk) across source countries. As before, the concentration indices are lagged one period.
As shown in section 2.4, export diversication maers in the aggregate. is result
was expected due to the following: when export values of an exporter-importer (exporter-
industry) are spread out across dierent industries (markets), some of the industry (mar-
ket) specic shocks will oset each other causing aggregate export revenues to be more
stable. For instance, the results of section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2.1 suggest that Canada-U.S. exports
overall become more stable if Canada exports an additional product to the U.S. Similarly,
Canada-“maple syrup” exports become more stable overall when Canada’s maple syrup
industry exports to an additional market. Following the same logic, U.S.-“maple syrup”
imports are expected to become more stable when the U.S.’s maple syrup industry imports
from an additional source country.
26
e presence of a free trade agreement between a country pair reduces uncertainty in the trade envi-
ronment and lowers Instability 1 (not statistically signicant for Instability 2 though), but GATT/WTO
membership and export instability have no statistical relationship (see Table 2.5). ese results are not
consistent with Ederington et al. (2021) pointing to the fact that the choice of export instability measures,
using non-logged vs logged trade ows, and controlling for non-logged vs logged trade volume maers
when examining the eects of trade agreements on trade volatility.
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However, at the disaggregated level, the eects of diversication are presumed to go
away. One would not expect the stability of Canada-U.S.-“maple syrup” exports to be
aected by Canada exporting an additional product to the U.S. or Canada’s maple syrup
industry exporting to an additional market. Likewise, it seems unlikely that the stability of
Canada-U.S.-“maple syrup” exports is inuenced by U.S.’s maple syrup industry importing
from an additional source country/exporter. is is indeed true for HHI industry. Export
diversication of an exporter-importer across industries reduces aggregate volatility as
shown in Table 2.3, but it no longer aects export earnings volatility at the disaggregated
level. Even if it does, the eect is not economically signicant (change in Instability 1 by
less than one percent of its median). (See the rst row of Table 2.5.)
Surprisingly, this does not seem to be the case forHHImarketikt andHHI
market
jkt . at is,
diversication across destination markets (importers) or source countries (exporters) still
maers at the disaggregated level. e estimated coecients of the two concentration
indices are positive and both statistically and economically signicant in all columns of
Table 2.5. On average, a rise in HHImarketikt by one standard deviation (0.284) raises In-
stability 1 by approximately 7.5 percentage points, ceteris paribus, which is 15 percent of
the median value of Instability 1 (50.483) (Refer to the rst three columns of Table 2.5.) In
addition, Instability 1 increases by approximately 9 percent of the median as HHImarketjkt
rises by one standard deviation (0.263), holding all else constant. Even though shocks
in the destination markets or source countries are not oset at the disaggregated level,
diversication across these countries still somehow reduces volatility. is is an unex-
pected result that requires further study, but it could be that diversied country-industry
pairs (both exporter-industry and importer-industry) have more established institutions,
infrastructure, and networks that facilitate trade since they have trade relationships with
various partners. is perhaps leads to enhanced consistency and predictability in trade
ows, and therefore, lower trade volatility.
2.5.2 Durability
Previously in section 2.4.2.2, export earnings of durable goods were shown to exhibit
greater volatility than those of nondurable goods in the aggregate. is result also holds
at the disaggregated level. On average, durable goods sectors are 6–7 percentage points
more volatile than those of nondurable goods, holding other variables constant (refer to
Table 2.5). is is because spending on durable goods is more sensitive to business cycles
and more volatile. Moreover, since durable goods constitute a signicant part of trade
compared to GDP, studies have shown that the fall in trade was greater than the fall in
production during the recent global recession Engel and Wang (2011), Levchenko et al.
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(2010). e results in Table 2.5 are consistent with this view and further suggest that the
role of durable goods is not conned to explaining the trade collapse of 2008–2009 but to
the general volatility of trade. is may be of more interest to high-income economies
who have a higher share of durable goods in trade.
27
It may also be something that devel-
oping countries should expect in the future as their incomes grow and production expands
to include more durable goods.
2.5.3 Vertical Linkages
As discussed in section 2.4.2.3, vertical linkages lead to higher export earnings volatility
in the aggregate. Export instability rose in response to an increase in the indicator of
downstream vertical linkages (see Table 2.5), and intermediate goods sectors were found
to be more volatile than their non-intermediate counterparts (see Table A2 of Appendix
B). is result in the aggregate level persists at the disaggregated level—vertical linkages
remain to be associated with higher trade volatility. On average, Instability 1 grows by
approximately 1.5 percentage points (3 percent of the median value of Instability 1) as the
indicator of Downstream vertical linkages rises by one standard deviation (0.199), holding
other variables constant (refer to column (2) of Table 2.5).
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Despite the conventional
wisdom on vertical linkages, empirical studies have given mixed results regarding their
role in the Great Trade Collapse. is paper uncovers a clear positive relationship (both in
the aggregate and at the disaggregated level) between international trade in intermediate
inputs and export instability using an extensive global panel data.
2.5.4 Financial Vulnerability
As was the case in the aggregate level (2.4.2.4), industry nancial vulnerability does not
have a consistently signicant impact on export earnings volatility at the disaggregated
level in the pooled sample.
29
(See Table 2.5.) However, when restricting the sample to
country pairs where at least one is a developing country, which experiences relatively
greater nancial constraints, Trade credit reliance and Asset tangibility become consis-
tently signicant: On average, a rise in trade credit reliance of a sector by one standard
27
In 2011, the average share of durable goods in exports was 30 percent, and the share rises to 44 percent
for developed countries. For instance, in 2011, half of U.S. exports and 80 percent of South Korea’s exports
were durable goods.
28
e intermediate goods sector binary variable is no longer statistically signicant, though. It could be that
the intermediate goods sector binary variable does not fully capture vertical linkages. In fact, although
vertical specialization has increased over time, the share of intermediate goods in trade based on the UN
BEC classication has decreased from 1970 to 1992 Hummels et al. (2001).
29
Only Instability 2 is aected by Trade credit reliance and Asset tangibility, and not Instability 1.
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deviation leads to an increase in export instability by approximately 2 percent of its me-
dian, while a higher share of a sector’s tangible assets by one standard deviation decreases
export instability by approximately 2–4 percent of its median, holding all else equal.
30
It is
somewhat surprising that nancial vulnerability does not maer in explaining the varia-
tion of export earnings volatility in the pooled sample given the role trade nance played
in explaining the Great Trade Collapse Amiti and Weinstein (2011), Chor and Manova
(2012). is suggests that an industry’s nancial needs may be more responsive to specif-
ically nancial shocks. Furthermore, the result that developing countries’ export insta-
bility is aected by Trade credit reliance and Asset tangibility is consistent with Fisman
and Love (2003) and Braun (2005): developing countries have weak nancial intermedi-
aries, and thus, they are more reliant on borrowing from suppliers/buyers in the form of
trade credit as a substitute for institutional nancing, and they also have weak nancial
contractibility requiring borrowers to have a higher share of tangible assets to be able to
pledge collateral.
2.6 Conclusion
e determinants of export earnings volatility found in the literature are export concen-
tration, durability, vertical linkages, and nancial vulnerability. e eects of these vari-
ables on export instability have been examined both at the aggregate (exporter-importer
& exporter-industry) and disaggregated level (exporter-importer-industry) using a panel
approach. e ndings are summarized as follows:
For exporter-importer pairs, diversifying their exports across various industries helps
reduce the volatility of bilateral aggregate trade ows. Similarly, exporter-industry pairs
also experience lower export instability in the aggregate when their exports are spread
over dierent destination markets. is is because aggregate exports are less reliant on
the ups and downs of an individual industry or market as the number of industries and
markets increases, and the size of shocks is also mitigated as they oset each other. is
may be of interest to both governments and producers who prefer more stable export
revenues and the greater certainty and predictability that follows. For example, to achieve
greater stability of trade through diversication, countries may sign trade agreements
with new partners to create opportunities for exporting rms planning to do business
in a new foreign market. Or countries may expand the coverage of goods and services
receiving favorable treatment when signing a trade agreement to make exporting more
accessible and less costly for producers looking to engage in trade.
30
e table of results is not reported in this paper due to redundancy but readers may refer to Table A3 of
Appendix B to get the point.
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As expected, the eects of diversication by industry goes away at the disaggre-
gated level. But unexpectedly, the eects of diversication by destination markets and
source countries remain even at the disaggregated level. An exporter-industry (importer-
industry)’s diversication of exports (imports) across many destination countries (source
countries) reduces the volatility of an exporter-importer-industry’s export earnings. Fur-
ther study is required to understand this result, but it could be that diversied country-
industry pairs have beer access to institutions, infrastructure, and networks for trade
which in turn increases consistency and predictability in the trade environment and re-
sult in lower trade volatility.
Export earnings of durable goods sectors are more volatile than those of nondurables
sectors both at the aggregate and disaggregated level. is is related to the fact that
durable goods have bigger shocks than nondurable goods because people adjust their
spending more on durables. Since developed countries tend to have a higher share of
durable goods in their exports, this nding may be of greater relevance to developed
economies as well as developing countries in the future as their incomes rise and their
export baskets include more durables. Possible policies may include the provision of ad-
ditional insurance to rms exporting durable products to help them smooth their export
revenues.
Vertical linkages, or trade in intermediate goods, have contributed to raising export
earnings volatility. Conventional wisdom has it that global supply chains have increased
the interconnectedness of countries and industries and the exposure to external shocks,
which may have magnied the drop in trade during the global recession. Nevertheless,
results of empirical studies have been mixed regarding the role of vertical linkages in the
Great Trade Collapse. is paper, using an extensive panel of bilateral trade data at the
industry level, uncovers a clear positive relationship between vertical linkages and export
instability. It is also consistent with Levchenko et al. (2010) which nds that intermediate
goods sectors experienced greater falls in trade during the Great Recession.
Lastly, Chor and Manova (2012) nds that nancially constrained industries experi-
enced a larger drop in exports during the global nancial crisis. I do not nd, however,
that these industries have more volatile export earnings in general. is suggests that
nancial constraints may aect trade volatility only during nancial shocks and not in
general. In addition, trade credit reliance and asset tangibility become signicant only
aer restricting the sample to developing countries. is is because for developing coun-
tries, trade credit is an alternative source of funds to the few formal lenders they have and




Table 2.1: Summary Statistics - Response Variable (Export Earnings Volatility)
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
ijt (N=424,129)
Instability 1 48.315 38.211 35.455 0.448 199.928
Instability 2 73.868 57.151 134.904 1.417 16,290.920
ikt (N=1,371,502)
Instability 1 46.223 36.332 34.672 0.382 199.979
Instability 2 72.108 58.462 107.483 1.084 15,986.948
ijkt (N=24,279,398)
Instability 1 57.199 50.483 34.507 0 199.999
Instability 2 82.573 66.208 113.666 <0.001 50,490.754
i: Exporter, j: importer, k: industry, t: year
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics - Explanatory Variables
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
ijt (N=424,129)
HHI industry 0.348 0.246 0.302 0.006 1
FTA dummy 0.093 0 0.290 0 1
GATT/WTO dummy 0.714 1 0.452 0 1
Trade volume (bil U.S.$) 0.426 0.007 4.058 <0.001 351.108
ikt (N=1,371,502)
HHI marketikt 0.414 0.334 0.284 0.013 1
Trade volume (bil U.S.$) 0.122 0.002 1.105 <0.001 171.639
jkt (N=3,152,347)
HHI marketjkt 0.466 0.399 0.263 0.038 1
ijkt (N=24,279,398)
Trade volume (mil U.S.$) 6.726 0.170 112.393 0.001 69,065.914
k (N=590)
Durable dummy 0.354 0 0.479 0 1
Downstream vertical linkages (N=587) 0.184 0.131 0.199 0.006 1.893
Intermediate dummy 0.612 1 0.488 0 1
External nance dependence 0.999 0.912 0.355 0.660 3.654
Trade credit reliance 0.089 0.091 0.022 0.037 0.175
Asset tangibility 0.337 0.338 0.115 0.104 0.741
i: Exporter, j: importer, k: industry, t: year
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Table 2.3: Bilateral Trade (ijt)
(1) (2)






FTA dummy 0.920 2.334
(0.748) (2.088)
GATT/WTO dummy 0.449 -5.862
(1.363) (4.986)




Exporter-Importer FE (αij) Yes Yes
Exporter-Year FE (αit) Yes Yes
Importer-Year FE (αjt) Yes Yes
Year FE (αt) Yes Yes
Observations 424,129 424,129
R2 0.578 0.250
Standard errors are two-way clustered by exporter & importer and reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.4: Industry-Level Trade (ikt)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)


























(0.743) (0.723) (0.755) (1.071) (1.055) (1.092)












(1.719) (1.712) (1.948) (2.525) (2.480) (2.665)
External nance dependence 0.306 -0.087
(0.844) (1.257)
Trade credit reliance 4.062 15.358
(15.298) (23.572)
Asset tangibility 0.277 -8.405
(3.351) (5.559)












(0.255) (0.256) (0.255) (0.187) (0.187) (0.188)
Exporter FE (αi) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter-Year FE (αit) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE (αt) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,371,502 1,371,502 1,371,502 1,371,502 1,371,502 1,371,502
R2 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.075 0.075 0.075
Standard errors are two-way clustered by exporter & industry and reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Bilateral Trade at the Industry Level (ijkt)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)









0.405 0.438 0.440 0.633















































(0.780) (0.772) (0.760) (1.006) (0.995) (1.000)












(1.807) (1.786) (1.955) (2.556) (2.527) (2.666)
External nance dependence -0.024 -0.008
(0.987) (1.338)
Trade credit reliance 20.123 48.778
∗∗
(16.026) (19.431)











-0.225 -0.204 -0.191 -0.083
(0.439) (0.438) (0.437) (0.517) (0.564) (0.563) (0.563) (0.506)
GATT/WTO dummy 1.463 1.443 1.438 0.474 3.018 2.968 2.946 1.957
(0.968) (0.962) (0.963) (1.034) (1.944) (1.936) (1.941) (2.127)
















(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Exp-Imp FE (αij) Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Exp-Imp-Ind FE (αijk) No No No Yes No No No Yes
Exp-Year FE (αit) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Imp-Year FE (αjt) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind-Year FE (αkt) No No No Yes No No No Yes
Year FE (αt) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,279,398 24,279,398 24,279,398 24,631,295 24,279,398 24,279,398 24,279,398 24,631,295
R2 0.128 0.128 0.128 0.457 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.240
Standard errors are three-way clustered by exporter, importer, & industry and reported in parentheses.




Figure 2.1: Average Export Earnings over Time
(a) Bilateral trade (exporter-importer-year) (b) Industry-level trade (exporter-industry-year)
Figure 2.2: Bilateral Trade - Average Export Earnings Volatility over Time
(a) Full sample (b) Consistent sample: 2,190 country pairs
Figure 2.3: Industry-Level Trade - Average Export Earnings Volatility over Time
(a) Full sample
(b) Consistent sample: 7,415 exporter-
industry pairs
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Figure 2.4: Bilateral Trade - Developed vs Developing Exporter
(a) Average Instability 1 (b) Average Instability 2
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Chapter 3 Do Trade Agreements Actually Reduce Trade Volatility?
3.1 Introduction
Although much empirical aention has been paid to the second part of the World Trade
Organization’s (WTO) mandate, “to ensure that trade ows as … freely as possible”, less
aention has been paid to the rst part of that mandate, “to ensure that trade ows as
smoothly (and) predictably … as possible”. Indeed, it is immediately apparent that cre-
ating conditions for a stable and predictable business environment is considered vital to
the mission of not only the WTO, but also the vast majority of regional trade agreements
(RTAs). References to creating “stability” or “predictability” or reducing “uncertainty”
abound on the WTO webpage and also appear in the objective statements of most RTAs.
1
Indeed, institutions such as the WTO are not viewed simply as providing a forum for nego-
tiated tari concessions, but also increasing the security and stability of the international
trading system by securing those market access commitments against unilateral infringe-
ment.
2
However, this raises an empirical question of whether countries that join a trade
agreement in fact experience more stability in their trade relations (measured by reduced
trade ow volatility). In this paper, we conduct a large-scale empirical test of this question
using industry-level bilateral trade ow data and a gravity specication approach.
Two recent events have focused aention on the ability of trade agreements to provide
more stability in trade relationships. e rst event was China’s ascension into the WTO
and the subsequent explosion in Chinese exports. As many researchers have noticed (e.g.,
see Feng et al. (2017)) China was already aorded most-favored nation (MFN) status by
many WTO members, including the United States, prior to their entry into the WTO. us,
their entry into the WTO was not accompanied by much change in the de facto taris
faced by Chinese exporters. As a result, the large increase in Chinese exports has been
aributed primarily to China obtaining access to the WTO’s mechanisms for providing
stability and certainty in trade relationships. Indeed, Handley and Limão (2017) estimates
that one-third of the export growth between the U.S. and China can be aributed to greater
certainty about U.S. trade policy. e second event was the trade collapse during the
global recession (i.e., the almost unprecedented fall in the global volume of trade that far
1
Both Manseld and Reinhardt (2008) and Rose (2005) provide numerous examples of the stated intentions
of trade agreement being to stabilize trade ows.
2
For example see Bagwell and Staiger (2001) and Bagwell et al. (2002) which lay out how the legal framework
of the GATT/WTO achieves secure market access.
30
outweighed the fall in global output), which sparked a large literature on its causes
3
and
generated interest in the potential role of the WTO and other trade institutions as a force
for trade stability. In addition to several theoretical and empirical investigations of the
link between the policy certainty generated by trade agreements and various economic
outcomes (e.g., see Handley (2014) and Limão and Maggi (2015)), a recent study, Jakubik
and Piermartini (2019), has found that WTO accession reduced the probability that import
shocks would lead to changes in trade policy.
Given the centrality of trade stability in the objective statements of most international
trade agreements, it is perhaps not surprising that this empirical question has been investi-
gated previously (although the dearth of studies is perhaps surprising). Specically, both
Rose (2005) and Manseld and Reinhardt (2008) run variants on what Head and Mayer
(2014) denes as “naive gravity regressions”: regressing several measures of trade volatil-
ity computed from annual bilateral trade ows on membership in an international trade
agreement and a standard set of country-level control variables drawn from the gravity
literature.
4
What is surprising, given the similarity of their approaches, is that their re-
sults dier drastically: Rose (2005) concludes that GATT/WTO membership has no eect
on trade volatility while Manseld and Reinhardt (2008) nds strong evidence that both
RTA and GATT/WTO membership reduces trade volatility.
However, there have been many recent advances in the gravity regression literature,
both theoretical and empirical, that have improved our understanding of the eects of
trade agreements on trade ows (see surveys by Head and Mayer (2014) and Yotov et al.
(2016)). Our research question is clearly related to a long-standing empirical literature that
has investigated the eect of trade agreement membership on the volume of international
trade (e.g., see Rose (2004) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007)). Indeed, both Cipollina and
Salvatici (2010) and Head and Mayer (2014) provide meta-analyses of this literature and
conclude that RTAs have a large estimated eect on trade ows. e high variation in
estimated eects across papers is also striking, with Head and Mayer (2014) noting that
this variation is to a large extent driven by the equation specication. For instance, Baier
and Bergstrand (2007) nds that the estimated eect of an RTA on trade almost doubles
when one included country-pair xed eects to control for latent factors that might be
3
Potential explanations for the trade collapse proposed in the literature are vertical production linkages
(Levchenko et al. (2010)), compositional eects (Engel and Wang (2011)), trade nance (Amiti and Weinstein
(2011) and Chor and Manova (2012)), and inventory adjustment (Alessandria et al. (2010)).
4
Rose (2005) has over 175 countries from 1950–1999 and Manseld and Reinhardt (2008) has 162 countries
from 1951–2001. e reference to “naive” regressions is not meant to be disparaging as these two papers
have combined over 500 citations including many in top economics journals. Rather, Head and Mayer
(2014) uses the term to refer to the literature, prior to the appearance of papers such as Anderson and
Van Wincoop (2003), which relied less on xed eects to control for latent factors such as multilateral
resistance.
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correlated with both trade ows and treaty participation. us, our intent in this paper is
to, both theoretically and empirically, revisit the question of how joint membership in an
international trade agreement might aect the volatility of trade ows between trading
partners.
As a rst step, we take a more structural approach to our estimating equation than
Rose (2005) and Manseld and Reinhardt (2008). In so doing, we uncover a more ambigu-
ous theoretical relationship between trade agreement membership and trade volatility
than has been previously considered. Specically, aer removing own-country volatility
(which we do through time-varying country xed eects), we show that any remaining
variation in bilateral trade volatility is due to variation in bilateral trade costs and the
covariance in economic outcomes between the importing and exporting countries. e
focus of the literature has been on how trade agreements might provide more certainty
with respect to bilateral trade ows by reducing the volatility of bilateral trade barriers.
However, what has received less aention is that trade agreements (especially explicitly
regional trade agreements) can also inuence bilateral trade volatility by aecting the
covariance in economic outcomes between countries. Indeed, there is a small empirical
literature suggesting that such regional trade agreements have increased business cycle
co-movements between member countries (e.g., see Bejan (2011) and De Pace (2013)). If
this is the case, then it is possible that even an agreement that successfully reduces the
volatility of trade barriers between trading partners could still increase bilateral trade
volatility.
5
us, the question of whether trade agreements actually reduce overall trade
volatility becomes an empirical question (and, potentially, provides insight into the am-
biguous results from previous studies).
In this paper, we use a panel of industry-level bilateral trade data, covering nearly 200
countries and over 600 industries from 1964 to 2012, to estimate our preferred empirical
specication. In contrast to previous studies, we employ time-varying country-industry
xed eects to control for country-industry volatility and run the specication at the
industry level to control for industry heterogeneity (in section 3.4 we provide some evi-
dence that measures of volatility averaged across industries are heavily inuenced by the
set of industries traded). Looking at the eect of trade agreement membership on various
measures of bilateral export volatility reveals an interesting empirical regularity. While
WTO membership consistently reduces trade volatility, membership in an RTA actually
increases bilateral trade volatility. Indeed, the positive impact of RTA membership on trade
volatility increases as the member countries become more integrated (i.e., progress from
5
is also emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between policy certainty (as studied by Handley
(2014) and Limão and Maggi (2015)) and trade stability (as studied in this paper).
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a free trade agreement, to a customs union, to a common market). is result is consistent
with our theory, since a regional trade agreement is much more likely to impact bilateral
comovements than a multilateral agreement. Of course, if this is the case, it suggests that
the dual goals of regional trade agreements in both increasing integration and reducing
trade volatility (at least as we have measured it) might be fundamentally incompatible.
In what follows, section 3.2 provides a structural approach to investigating the link
between trade policy membership and bilateral trade volatility, section 3.3 introduces the
data, sections 3.4 and 3.5 provide the results, and section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Motivation
Consider a standard sectoral structural gravity relationship between bilateral trade and
its determinants, as derived by Yotov et al. (2016) where i denotes the exporting country,









Trade ows from exporter i to destination j in sector k,Xijk, can be decomposed into three






Yik is dened as the value of production or nominal income in country i and sector k and
Ejk denotes expenditure in country j and sector k (the product of the two is normalized
by aggregate world production Yk ≡
∑
i Yik). e trade cost term consists of three parts.
First, the bilateral trade cost between countries i and j, tijk, which is sector-specic, cap-
tures both time-invariant aspects of the bilateral relationship (e.g., geographic or cultural
distance) and time-varying aspects (e.g., taris or shipping costs). e other two terms,
πik and Pjk, capture the standard multilateral resistance terms discussed in Anderson and
Van Wincoop (2003).
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ey too are sector-specic and measure the ease of relative market
access of the exporter i and importer j, respectively.
Assuming that the structural gravity equation (1) holds for every period t, it can be
log-linearized to yield the familiar gravity equation:
lnXijkt = lnEjkt+ lnYikt− lnYkt+(1−σk)lntijkt−(1−σk)lnPjkt−(1−σk)lnπikt (3.2)
Since we are interested in the volatility of trade ows, we compute the variance of
these logged trade ows, V ar(lnXijkt), which can be expressed as the sum of variance
6



















. Finally, note that σk > 1 is




V ar(lnXijkt) = Vikt + Vjkt + (1− σk)2V ar(lntijkt) + CVijkt (3.3)
where Vikt is a collection of variance and covariance terms specic to the exporting coun-
try and Vjkt is a collection of variance and covariance terms specic to the importing
country.
8
In our empirical specication, we absorb these variance terms into two time-
varying country-industry xed eects, αikt and αjkt.
e focus of this paper is on the last two terms of this expression which capture the
bilateral variation in trade volume volatility. First, V ar(lntijkt) is the variance in bilateral
trade costs across time. is encompasses both shipping costs (e.g., variance in fuel costs
which could be a function of distance) and trade barriers (e.g., variance in taris). e
key question in the paper is the extent to which a trade agreement between country i and
j leads to more predictability in trade ows by reducing the year-to-year variability of
these trade barriers. us, we model the variability of trade costs as given by:
(1− σk)2V ar(lntijkt) = γijk + δTAijt + µijkt (3.4)
where γijk represents an intrinsic component to this variability (e.g., distance or product
characteristics), µijkt is an additive error term, and TAijt ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator variable
which takes the value of one if the two countries have a trade agreement in year t. In-
ternational trade agreements are thought to reduce the variability of such trade barriers
through several mechanisms. First, of course, they secure any market access commitments
achieved through negotiations directly via restrictions on a country’s trade policies (e.g.,
binding tari ceilings and export subsidy restrictions). Second, they constrain the use
of domestic policy (either intentional or unintentional) that might reduce market access
below negotiated levels (see especially Article 3 of GATT).
9
Finally, they provide greater
transparency and clarity about foreign trade barriers, thus imposing a cost to either intro-
ducing new trade barriers or “reinterpreting” old ones (as any changes would be subject
8
Specically,
Vikt = V ar(lnYikt) + (1− σk)2V ar(lnπikt) + .5V ar(lnYkt)− 2Cov(lnYikt, lnYkt)
− 2(1− σk)Cov(lnYikt, lnπikt) + 2(1− σk)Cov(lnYkt, lnπikt).
Similarly,
Vjkt = V ar(lnEjkt) + (1− σk)2V ar(lnPjkt) + .5V ar(lnYkt)− 2Cov(lnEjkt, lnYkt)
− 2(1− σk)Cov(lnEjkt, lnPjkt) + 2(1− σk)Cov(lnYkt, lnPjkt).
9
For a discussion, see Bagwell and Staiger (2001).
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to either retaliation or dispute selement procedures). erefore, the underlying assump-
tion is that the existence of a trade agreement leads to greater certainty in trade barriers
between the trading partners, and thus δ ≤ 0.
Second, CVijkt in equation 3.3 is a collection of cross-country covariance terms
10
(e.g.,
Cov(lnEjkt, lnYikt)). Once again, these bilateral covariance terms could be a function of
time-invariant factors that inuence how similar the countries are in production struc-
tures or how closely their economies are intertwined. However, it is also reasonable to
assume that these cross-country covariance terms may be a function of whether or not the
countries have a trade agreement. us, we model the cross-country covariance between
a trading pair as being given by:
CVijkt = λijk + ρTAijt + νijkt (3.5)
where λijk represents the intrinsic component to this variability and νijkt is an additive
error term. Note that, in this case, our prediction about the sign of ρ is somewhat am-
biguous as we don’t have an underlying model of how these countries are connected.
11
For example, if one assumes a classical model of trade, it is possible that the existence of
a trade agreement could lead to greater specialization and thus a more dissimilar produc-
tion structure that could even result in negative cross-country correlations. However, the
conventional wisdom seems to be that international agreements tend, through increased
connections and standardization of various policies, to lead to greater synchronizations
of business cycles across member countries (see Bejan (2011) and De Pace (2013)). us,
we expect that ρ ≥ 0.
Combining the above, the resulting empirical gravity equation for the volatility of
trade ows is given as the following:
V ar(lnXijkt) = βTAijt + αikt + αjkt + αijk + εijkt (3.6)
Note, however, that the sign of β is ambiguous as it is a combination of the negative
eect of trade agreements on the variability of trade costs (δ ≤ 0) and the possible positive
10
Specically:
CVijkt = 2Cov(lnEjkt, lnYikt) + 2(1− σk)Cov(lnEjkt, lntijkt)− 2(1− σk)Cov(lnEjkt, lnπikt)
+ 2(1− σk)Cov(lnYikt, lntijkt)− 2(1− σk)Cov(lnYikt, lnPjkt)− 2(1− σk)Cov(lnYkt, lntijkt)
− 2(1− σk)2Cov(lntijkt, lnPjkt)− 2(1− σk)2Cov(lntijkt, lnπikt) + 2(1− σk)2Cov(lnPjkt, lnπikt)
11
It should be acknowledged here that, in our modeling of the covariance, we are abstracting away from
the underlying structure of our gravity equation which takes aggregate production and expenditure as
exogenous, and thus the covariance of these terms is not modeled.
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eect of trade agreements on the cross-country covariance terms (ρ ≥ 0). us, even if
trade agreements are successful in creating more certainty and predictability about trade
barriers and trade costs, this will not necessarily translate into reduced volatility of bilat-
eral trade ows. e estimated impact of trade agreements on volatility is, therefore, an
empirical question that we explore in the following sections.
3.3 Data
e trade data comes from the UN Comtrade Database. Data on export values in current
U.S. dollars is collected for each exporter(reporter)-importer(partner)-industry at the SITC
Rev. 1 four-digit level from 1962 to 2014 and used to compute the export earnings volatility
measures (to be dened in the next section). One of the complications in investigating
the link between trade agreements and trade volatility is that there are many ways of
measuring volatility, and these measures are invariably ad hoc.
12
However, our structural
framework in section 3.2 provides some guidance in how we measure volatility. Some
measures are computed over rolling ve-year periods while others use two periods, yet
all focus on year-to-year volatility and have the following characteristics:
First, to be consistent with our derived equation, 3.6, we focus on measures of the
volatility in log trade. As a result, our main volatility measures are based more on year-
to-year (approximate) percentage changes in trade ows than on absolute changes in trade
volume. However, in Appendix C we provide some robustness checks using alternative
measures of volatility based on non-logged trade ows and nd similar results.
Second, we calculate our volatility measures at a disaggregated four-digit SITC level
(as opposed to aggregated country-level measures). is is done for two reasons. First, to
get a level of disaggregation that provides a more accurate picture of bilateral volatility.
For example, to the extent that volatility varies across sectors (e.g., see Han (2021a) for
evidence that durable goods tend to have higher levels of trade volatility), more aggregate
measures of bilateral trade volatility could potentially be determined by the set of indus-
tries traded (which would be inuenced by trade agreements as well). Indeed, in section
3.4 we show that standard measures of volatility are heavily inuenced by such selection
eects. Second, to get a level of aggregation that policy makers would care about. e
fact that the vast majority of trade barriers do not vary across rms leads to the formation
of industry-level lobbying groups to inuence governmental policy. us, many models
12
ere is an extensive literature that has investigated the determinants of export volatility. See Massell
(1970), MacBean and Nguyen (1980), Love (1986), and Han (2021a). One of the constant sources of discus-
sion in this literature is the proper measure of volatility as well as the need to test robustness of results to
various measures.
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of the political economy of trade protection model trade protection as emerging from a
lobbying game between politically organized industries and governmental policy makers
(e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1994)). While the exact level of aggregation is perhaps not
specied, the vast majority of empirical studies of the political economy of trade protec-
tion in the U.S. are at the three or four-digit SIC level (see Gawande and Krishna (2004))
which is approximately the level of aggregation we adopt in this paper.
ird, our underlying structural model assumes positive trade ows and so our focus
is on volatility in the intensive margin of trade. us, we only analyze existing, stable trade
relationships between country pairs. Specically, our dataset includes only observations
with exports that exceed 500 USD in each of the surrounding ve years.
13
us we are
not analyzing the impact of trade agreements on volatility associated with the entry and
exit of new products and new markets. Of course, the impact of trade agreements on
xed costs and, thus, potential volatility in the extensive margin of trade is also an area of
interest and something we intend to analyze in a following paper. Although, it should be
noted that Bernard et al. (2009) nds that short-run (year-to-year) changes in aggregate
U.S. exports are predominately accounted for by changes in the intensive margin (this is
due to the fact that recently added/dropped product-country trade ows are, on average,
smaller than continuing product-country trade ows.)
e data on regional trade agreements (RTAs) is from the NSF-Kellogg Institute Eco-
nomic Integration Agreements (EIA) database which records the level of economic inte-
gration of each country pair from 1950 to 2012. e RTA ranking variable is a multichoto-
mous index dened for each country pair in a particular year which ranges from 0 to 6
with interpretations described in Table 3.1.
Finally, data on the year of GATT or WTO membership is obtained from Tomz et al.
(2007), which classies formal members as well as nonmember participants such as colonies,
de facto members, and provisional members as having GATT membership given that they
also had rights and obligations under the agreement.
14
e GATT/WTO binary variable
13
Prior to year 2000, the minimum trade value reported was 501 USD. However, any positive dollar value has
been reported since 2000. For consistency, the sample is restricted to export values that exceed 500 USD.
e ve-year requirement also assures that we do not have to deal with the complications of zero-trade
ows in our volatility measures. Since the 500 USD gure is somewhat ad hoc, we also ran the speci-
cations with a 5000 USD cut-o (resulting in the number of observations falling by around 15 percent).
Results were consistent in that the coecient estimate on the RTA variable was positive and statistically
signicant for all volatility measures. However, the coecient estimates for the WTO variable were no
longer statistically signicant.
14
Rose (2004) obtains data on GATT/WTO membership from the World Trade Organization website and
nds lile evidence that formal members experienced growth in trade compared to the nonmembers.
is result is reversed by Tomz et al. (2007) when it includes nonmember participants who shared the
major duties and privileges of the agreement.
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is created such that GATT/WTO = 1 if both exporter and importer are formal members
or nonmember participants of the GATT or WTO and zero otherwise.
e nal dataset includes 180 exporting countries, 194 importing countries, and 620
SITC Rev. 1 four-digit industries from 1964 to 2012.
3.4 Empirics
To empirically examine the eects of trade agreements on export earnings volatility, we
estimate equation 3.6. e presence of trade agreements is captured by the RTA ranking
and GATT/WTO binary variable. Another issue to take into account is that the decision
to join a trade agreement is endogenous. Here, given our panel data approach, we fol-
low the trade literature in the use of country-pair and time-varying country xed eects
to account for any latent factors that might determine both trade ows and agreement
participation (see discussion in Head and Mayer (2014)). us, as in Baier and Bergstrand
(2007), we employ country-pair xed eects to account for any time-invariant bilateral de-
terminants of agreement participation. Likewise, as in Aichele and Felbermayr (2015), we
employ time-varying country xed eects to control for any time-varying determinants
of trade agreement membership.
15
As mentioned, several measures of export earnings volatility are introduced due to the
ad hoc nature of measuring volatility. e standard and detrended measures are presented
in the following subsections, respectively. en in Appendix C we consider some other
variants that have also been employed in the literature.
3.4.1 Standard Measures of Volatility
3.4.1.1 Denition
e standard measures of volatility are similar to those used in Rose (2005) and Manseld
and Reinhardt (2008) as well as a related literature on the determinants of export volatility
(e.g., see Massell (1964), Wong (1986), and Han (2021a)). First, the squared log dierence
(Sq log di )16 is the squared value of the change in log export values for each exporter-
15
Other papers that employ xed eects to control for endogenous agreement membership include Regolo
(2013), Baier et al. (2014), and Soete and Van Hove (2017).
16
Manseld and Reinhardt (2008) also uses the absolute log dierence:
Abs log di = |lnXijkt − lnXijk(t−1)|
e dierence between the squared log dierence and the absolute log dierence is that the former places
higher weights on larger uctuations. However, as we show in Appendix C, coecient estimates are
similar if we use the absolute value measure.
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importer-industry (ijk) between years t-1 and t:





Larger values represent wider year-to-year uctuations leading to greater export earnings
volatility. e second and third measures capture the average deviation from a ve-year
moving average. Variance 1 is the variance or average squared deviation from the ve-year
mean log export value for each exporter-importer-industry (ijk), computed over rolling











t lnXijkt. Similarly, CV 1 is the coecient of variation (the ratio of
the standard deviation to the mean), also computed over rolling ve-year periods centered
on the observation year. It measures variability relative to the mean, making comparisons
across dierent exporter-importer-industry (ijk) triplets possible, and is used to measure
export instability in Rose (2005).
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e measure is expressed as a percentage. For example,













Summary statistics for these three standard measures are provided in Table 3.2 and
average values are ploed over time in Figure 3.1 (scaled so that 1964 = 100). What is
perhaps surprising in Figure 3.1 is that volatility appears to be increasing substantially
over time including an especially rapid rise at the beginning of the sample period. How-
ever, this increase is primarily due to the addition of newer (and smaller) high-volatility
trade relations, which raises average volatility considerably. In Figure 3.2, we restrict
the sample to ijk triplets that have observations for all years in the sample (mostly long-
standing trade relations between developed countries), and volatility declines consistently
and substantially over time for all three measures. is distinction is important as it is ex-
actly this bilateral variation over time that we are exploiting in our empirical specication
to estimate the eect of trade agreements on volatility, and this is one of the main reasons
we estimate our regressions at the disaggregated industry level.
17




Table 3.3 presents the results of estimating equation 3.6 using our three standard measures
of volatility.
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Log export value is included in the rst two columns since Sq log di and
Variance 1 do not control for scale issues.19 e rst column of Table 3.3 presents results
with the squared log dierence in annual trade ows as the dependent variable. On aver-
age, when the RTA ranking increases by 1 category (e.g., from no trade agreement of any
kind to a non-reciprocal preferential trade agreement or from a PTA to an FTA), Sq log
di rises by 0.048, which is 21.24% of the median (holding GATT/WTO membership and
trade volume constant). On the other hand, when both exporting and importing countries
are members of the GATT/WTO, Sq log di decreases by 0.027, which is an economically
signicant (albeit statistically insignicant) 11.95% of the median, holding other variables
constant.
e second column presents the results using our ve-year measure of variance in ex-
port ows. As can be seen, a similar paern emerges in which membership in a regional
trade agreement increases export volatility in the bilateral pair, while membership in the
multilateral GATT/WTO reduces trade volatility. However, the magnitude of the esti-
mates are reduced (although, now, the coecient estimate on GATT/WTO membership
is statistically signicant). Specically, a one category increase in a regional trade agree-
ment causes Variance 1 to rise by 0.014, which is 4.55% of the median, while, when both
exporting and importing countries are members of the GATT/WTO, Variance 1 decreases
by 0.028, which is 9.09% of the median.
e next two columns report results for the coecient of variation (CV 1) in trade
ows, where our measure of volatility is normalized by the volume of trade. Comparing
column 3 (which does not include the log of trade as an additional control) with column 4
(which does) shows that the estimated impact of trade agreement membership on volatil-
ity is much more negative when trade volume is not included. is is due to the strong
negative correlation between trade volume and trade volatility in all our measures, includ-
ing the coecient of variation (this can be conrmed with a simple scaer plot). us, in
addition to the direct eects discussed in section 3.2, trade agreements can also indirectly
reduce trade volatility simply by increasing the volume of trade.
18
Reported standard errors are clustered by country-pair. We also experimented with muli-way clustering
at the exporter-importer-industry-year level as suggested by Egger and Tarlea (2015). With multi-way
clustering the RTA index remains positive and statistically signicant in all specications; however, the
GATT/WTO variable is no longer statistically signicant.
19
Given our focus on log measures of volatility, it turns out that log export value and export earnings volatil-
ity are negatively correlated. is is because log dierence measures are approximations of percentage
changes and large percentage changes turn out to be much more likely at low export volume levels.
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e consistent paern that emerges from our analysis is that membership in a regional
trade agreement increases the degree of trade volatility between regional trading partners,
while membership in a multilateral agreement reduces trade volatility. One explanation
for this dierence can be found in our structural framework of section 3.2. e negative
coecient on the GATT/WTO is potentially due to it achieving its stated goals of reducing
the volatility of trade barriers and thus stabilizing trade ows. In addition, since it is a
multilateral agreement that stresses non-discrimination across members, it would not be
likely to drastically increase the covariance between any two bilateral trading partners.
In contrast, a regional trade agreement, which is inherently discriminatory, is more likely
to tie the trading partners more tightly together, increasing the covariance of economic
outcomes and thus the volatility of bilateral trade ows.
3.4.2 Detrended Measures of Volatility
3.4.2.1 Denition
One problem with the standard measures of volatility is that country pairs experience
growth in trade, particularly aer integrating into the world trading system, and this trade
growth may be mistaken for an increase in volatility. To separate the long-run growth of
exports over the period from short-run uctuations around the growth path, the trend can
be eliminated from the export series before constructing volatility measures as in Massell
(1970), Lawson (1974), Cariolle and Goujon (2015), and Han (2021a).
Figure 3.3 plots the average log export values against time. A linear trend is used to
t these log export values
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of each exporter-importer-industry (ijk) by estimating the
following by OLS:
lnXijkt = β0 + β1t+ εijkt (3.10)
where lnXijkt represents the logged value of exports from country i to partner j in indus-
try k and year t. en the residuals are obtained as the following:
eijkt = lnXijkt − ̂lnXijkt = lnXijkt − (β̂0 + β̂1t) (3.11)
where β̂0 and β̂1 are OLS coecient estimates.
e three detrended measures of volatility use these residuals. First, the squared dif-
ference in residuals (Sq di in resid)21 is the squared value of the dierence in residuals
20
is is equivalent to using an exponential trend to t the export values.
21
A similar measure is the absolute dierence in residuals (Abs di in resid), which is the absolute value of
the change in residuals for each exporter-importer-industry (ijk) between years t-1 and t:
Abs di in resid = |(eijkt − eijk(t−1))|
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for each exporter-importer-industry (ijk) between years t-1 and t:





Second, the variance of residuals (Variance 2) for each exporter-importer-industry (ijk)
over overlapping ve-year intervals is the average squared deviation of residuals from
the ve-year mean, centered on the year of the observation. Massell (1970) and Lawson
(1974) use a similar measure as what they call the export instability index, which is dened












t eijkt. ird, the coecient of variation of residuals (CV 2), also com-
puted over the ve years beginning two years before the observation, adjusts for the dif-














Summary statistics for these three detrended measures are provided in Table 3.4 and
average values are ploed over time in Figure 3.4 (once again scaled so that 1964 = 100).
To avoid issues generated by the changes in the set of ijk triplets over time, Figure 3.4
is drawn using a consistent set of ijk trade relationships that are in our sample for the
entire time period.
3.4.2.2 Results
Table 3.5 reports estimation results for equation 3.6 using the detrended measures of
volatility. As before, Sq di in resid and Variance 2 are not normalized by size and re-
quire the inclusion of trade volume. On the other hand, since CV 2 is standardized, one
specication includes trade volume and the other does not. e results in all four columns
show that greater regional integration is correlated with increases in trade volatility while
22
In Massell (1970), the instability index is calculated for each of 55 countries using data for the entire period
1950–66 and a cross-sectional analysis is conducted. Similarly, Lawson (1974) computes the weighted
instability index for a set of countries over two time periods: 1950–59 and 1960–69.
23
Given that the residuals can be either positive or negative, the standard deviation is divided by the average
of the absolute value of the residuals.
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multilateral integration is not (although the estimated coecients for GATT/WTO mem-
bership remain negative they are no longer statistically signicant).
24
In addition, the magnitudes of the estimates are quite consistent with those of the
standard measures of volatility. For example, consider column 1 which provides estimates
for the squared dierence in residuals. Increasing the RTA ranking by 1 category raises
Sq di in resid by 0.041, which is 18.72% of the median, holding other variables constant
(quite similar to the increase in volatility of 21.24% of the median estimated in section
3.4.1.2 for the squared log dierence). Also consistent with the results of section 3.4.1.2,
moving to the 5-year measures reduces the magnitude of the estimated impact of RTAs
but maintains the negative correlation between RTA membership and trade stability. For
example, see column 2 where an increase in the RTA ranking by 1 category raises Variance
2 by 0.011, which is 3.79% of the median (comparable to an increase in Variance 1 of 4.55%
of the median in section 3.4.1.2).
3.5 RTA Heterogeneity
One of the more surprising results of the previous section is that trade volatility actually
rises between country pairs that enter into a regional trade agreement (RTA). One poten-
tial explanation for this fact is that regional agreements are leading to increased bilateral
integration which could cause greater covariance between the trading partners (thus in-
creasing bilateral trade volatility). If so, then it seems possible that the more integrated
the countries get, the greater the increase in trade volatility. In the previous sections, we
estimated equation 3.6 with one multichotomous RTA ranking variable. In this section,
six separate RTA dummy variables are included to examine the heterogeneous eects of
the types of regional trade agreements (see Table 3.1 for denitions). For example, the
FTA binary variable has the value of 1 if the country pair is part of a free trade area. e
reference category is no trade agreement. Results are reported in Table 3.6.
As can be seen, as country pairs become more regionally integrated, the estimated
coecient becomes larger (i.e., export earnings volatility is increasing in regional inte-
gration). For example, consider column 1 which provides coecient estimates for the
squared log dierence dened in section 3.4.1.1. Recall that we previously estimated that
a one category increase in the RTA index causes Sq log di to rise by 21.24% of the median
(see section 3.4.1.2). Similarly, the rst column of Table 3.6 suggests that moving from no
agreement to a Free Trade Area (FTA) would increase Sq log di by 0.122 which is about
53.98% of its median value. However, going from no agreement all the way to an economic
24
As before, we also used the absolute value of the dierence in residuals as another measure of volatility
and obtained similar results.
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union (equivalent to a 6 category increase in the RTA index) would increase Sq log di by
0.340 which is around 150% of the median value.
Coecient estimates for our ve-year measures are reduced but remain economically
signicant. From section 3.4.1.2, we previously estimated that a one category increase in
a regional trade agreement causes Variance 1 to rise by 4.55% of the median. e results of
column 2 of Table 3.6 suggest that moving from no agreement to an FTA would increase
Variance 1 by around 14.20% of the median. However, moving from no agreement to a full
economic union would cause Variance 1 to increase by over twice as much (i.e., around
30.84% of its median value).
us, increased integration between bilateral trading partners appears to be coming at
the expense of increased year-to-year trade volatility. As mentioned, one possible expla-
nation is that increased integration is also leading to greater comovements in economic
outcomes across trading partners. Regardless, this correlation between the degree of in-
tegration and volatility in trade ows suggests that the joint goals of many regional trade
agreements to both integrate the economies of member countries and induce greater sta-
bility in trade relations may be in conict.
3.6 Conclusion
e GATT/WTO system has made great strides in reducing trade barriers over the past 70
years. However, even as existing trade barriers fall to record low levels, trade agreements
continue to proliferate. Partly this is due to the expansion of traditional trade agreements
into other areas such as intellectual property rights, but it is also partly due to the fact
that such agreements are viewed as important sources of stability for existing trade re-
lationships. Indeed, a legal-economics framework has emerged (see Bagwell and Staiger
(2001) and Bagwell et al. (2002)) which views these institutions as not simply a forum for
negotiations, but also a means to achieve secure market access to foreign markets. us,
for example, Canada’s objectives in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
negotiations were not so much to reduce U.S. trade barriers (there was already an existing
Canada-US free trade agreement), but rather to curtail the U.S.’s use of unilateral trade
actions (see Manseld and Reinhardt (2003)) and to clarify many of the prior trading rules
that might be subject to reinterpretation by the U.S. (see Abbo (2000)). Likewise, Jakubik
and Piermartini (2019) argues that one of the main benets of WTO membership is that
it constrains one’s trading partners from instituting trade barriers in response to import
shocks.
Consistent with this role for international agreements, we do nd some evidence of
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increased trade stability among members of the GATT/WTO. Specically, bilateral trade
ows between GATT/WTO members exhibit about 5–10 percent less year-to-year trade
volatility than other trade ows (relative to the median observation). Although it should
be noted that this result is not statistically signicant for all our measures of trade volatil-
ity, it provides some evidence of the ability of multilateral institutions to fulll their role
of providing stability and certainty in trade relationships between member institutions.
However, a robust and somewhat surprising result of our analysis is that bilateral
trade ows between members of a regional trade agreement exhibit increased year-to-
year trade volatility, and this positive correlation is both statistically and economically
signicant across all our measures of volatility. Why do regional agreements appear to
be correlated with increased trade volatility while multilateral agreements are correlated
with decreased trade volatility? One possible answer can be found in our structural grav-
ity approach: to the extent that regional trade agreements are more likely to increase the
covariance of economic outcomes across member countries, they may also contribute to
increased volatility in trade relations. is suggests that regional trade agreements’ goals
of integration and reduced volatility may be at odds with one another, and that increased
integration may come at a cost of heightened volatility. At the least it suggests that the
increased policy certainty provided by some trade agreements (e.g., see Handley (2014)
and Limão and Maggi (2015)) might not translate into reduced trade volatility.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) Ranking
Type of Agreement RTA Ranking Description
No country . At least one of the two countries does not exist or have independence
No agreement 0 Do not have any economic integration agreement
Non-reciprocal PTA 1 Preferential terms given to developing countries
Preferential trade agreement (PTA) 2 Preferential terms given to members
Free trade agreement (FTA) 3 No (or substantially low) trade barriers to members
Customs union 4 Same as FTA but equal treatment of non-members
Common market 5 Same as customs union but free movement of labor and capital
Economic union 6 Same as common market but monetary and scal policy coordination
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics - Standard Measures of Volatility
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
Sq log di 1.308 0.226 3.454 0 226.551
Variance 1 0.710 0.308 1.114 0 54.179
CV 1 6.026 4.632 4.771 0 86.020
Observations 23,050,547 23,050,547 23,050,547 23,050,547 23,050,547
Table 3.3: Eects of Trade Agreements on Export Earnings Volatility - Standard Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)







(0.003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.007)






(0.035) (0.015) (0.088) (0.071)







Exporter-industry-year (αikt) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer-industry-year (αjkt) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter-importer-industry (αijk) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,050,547 23,050,547 23,050,547 23,050,547
Adjusted R2 0.241 0.464 0.549 0.600
Standard errors are clustered by country pair and reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics - Detrended Measures of Volatility
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
Sq di in resid 1.292 0.219 3.424 0 227.730
Variance 2 0.679 0.290 1.075 0 50.241
CV 2 82.984 91.416 34.705 0.032 196.826
Observations 23,050,547 23,050,547 23,050,547 23,050,547 23,050,547
Table 3.5: Eects of Trade Agreements on Export Earnings Volatility - Detrended Mea-
sures
(1) (2) (3) (4)









(0.003) (0.001) (0.076) (0.068)
L.GATT/WTO dummy -0.019 -0.008 -0.812 -0.509
(0.035) (0.014) (0.685) (0.653)







Exporter-industry-year (αikt) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer-industry-year (αjkt) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter-importer-industry (αijk) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,050,547 23,050,547 23,050,545 23,050,545
Adjusted R2 0.235 0.466 0.318 0.342
Standard errors are clustered by country pair and reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: RTA Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sq log di Variance 1 CV 1 Sq di in resid Variance 2 CV 2












(0.014) (0.006) (0.028) (0.014) (0.006) (0.310)









(0.014) (0.006) (0.028) (0.013) (0.006) (0.268)



















































(0.027) (0.011) (0.054) (0.026) (0.011) (0.507)





(0.034) (0.015) (0.071) (0.034) (0.014) (0.651)












(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.019)
Exporter-industry-year (αikt) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer-industry-year (αjkt) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter-importer-industry (αijk) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,286,643 23,286,643 23,286,643 23,286,643 23,286,643 23,286,641
R2 0.397 0.574 0.682 0.392 0.575 0.478
Standard errors are clustered by country pair and reported in parentheses.



















1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Variance 1 CV 1
Sq log diff
All observations
Average values of volatility measures over time












1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Variance 1 CV 1
Sq log diff
Consistent sample, N=102,626
Average values of volatility measures over time
49
Figure 3.3: Average Log Export Earnings over Time
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Chapter 4 Did Countries with Diversied Exports Fare Better in the 2008 Global
Financial Crisis?
4.1 Introduction
e 2008 global nancial crisis was marked by a drop in output and proportionately larger
fall in trade. GDP in current U.S. dollars was 63.69 trillion in 2008 which dropped to
60.41 trillion in the following year World Bank (2021a), a 5.15 percent decrease, while
merchandise exports in current U.S. dollars were 16.275 trillion in 2008 which fell to 12.644
trillion in 2009 World Bank (2021b), a 22.31 percent decrease. is sudden, severe, and
synchronized plunge in world trade between the third quarter of 2008 and the second
quarter of 2009, which outpaced the reduction in GDP, is referred to as the Great Trade
Collapse (Baldwin, 2009).
A range of potential explanations for the Great Trade Collapse has been proposed in
the literature. One is the plunge in demand for postponable durable goods which con-
sist a large share of international trade Levchenko et al. (2010), Engel and Wang (2011).
Because durable goods consumption is more volatile than GDP and international trade is
concentrated in these durable goods, the fall in trade was larger than that of GDP during
the global nancial crisis. Another is the contraction of trade nance availability Amiti
and Weinstein (2011), Auboin and Engemann (2014), Chor and Manova (2012), Korinek
et al. (2010). Exporters are more reliant on trade nance because international transac-
tions take longer to process than domestic sales, increasing the needs for working capital
loans and insurance. For this reason, the tigher credit conditions and lack of trade nance
during the global nancial crisis had a bigger eect on trade than production. Finally, the
prevalence of vertical production linkages has made the transmission of shocks easier, and
Levchenko et al. (2010) nds that sectors that are intensively used as intermediate inputs
experienced greater reductions in trade during the Great Trade Collapse.
is paper examines the role of export concentration in the Great Trade Collapse using
both bilateral and product-level trade data. e paper nds that on average, a rise in the
product concentration index of 2007 by one standard deviation (0.307) results in a decrease
in bilateral exports between 2008 and 2009 by 15.956 million U.S. dollars
1
, holding all else
constant. Exporter-importer pairs whose exports were concentrated on a small number of
products experienced a greater trade collapse. In addition, the decline in bilateral exports
1
e median is a fall in bilateral exports by 0.570 million U.S. dollars; the mean is a decrease by 193.861
million U.S. dollars. See Table 4.2.
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due to the fall in trade nance activity was more severe for country pairs whose exports
were concentrated on few products. On the other hand, market concentration does not
have a consistently signicant eect on the trade collapse of exporter-product pairs, but
the paper nds that the nancial vulnerability of a product, specically external nance
dependence and asset tangibility, plays a larger role in the fall in exports as the market
concentration index increases.
ere have been numerous studies looking at the relationship between export con-
centration and export instability Coppock (1962), Massell (1964), MacBean (2011), Massell
(1970), Love (1986), Han (2021a)
2
. e underlying idea is that a country’s exports uctu-
ate with the ups and downs in the exports of a handful of products or markets when they
are concentrated, but the risks are diversied away when exports are dispersed over a
large number of products or markets. However, this paper and Romeu and da Costa Neto
(2011) are the only papers to the best of my knowledge that study the eects of export
concentration on trade focusing on the global nancial crisis. Using quarterly exports at
the HS two-digit level of 14 Latin American countries to 16 destination markets whose
trade comprises over 90 percent of world trade, Romeu and da Costa Neto (2011) nds
that increasing export diversication by industry and product reduces the quarterly de-
cline in exports, but geographic diverscation does not have a signicant impact. is
paper is dierent in that it expands the scope of analysis to 134 exporting countries, 191
importing countries, and 5,003 products dened at the HS 2002 six-digit level. Moreover,
it is the rst to look at the relationship between trade ows and trade nance availability
as a function of export concentration.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 starts with a cross-country
exercise. Section 4.3 discusses the data. Section 4.4 presents the empirical model as well
as regression results. Finally, section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 A Cross-Country Analysis
4.2.1 Variables and Data Sources
To motivate the study of the eects of export concentration on the Great Trade Collapse, a
cross-country excercise is performed using annual export values of 2008–2009 in current
U.S. dollars for 124 exporting countries obtained from UN Comtrade. e trade collapse
2
Han (2021a) empirically examines the eects of export concentration, durability, vertical linkages, and
nancial vulnerability on export earnings volatility using a panel of bilateral trade data at the SITC Rev. 1
four-digit industry level.
52
between 2008 and 2009 is measured by the change in exports as follows:
∆Exportsi = Exportsi2009 − Exportsi2008,
where i refers to the exporting country. Two dimensions of export concentration are mea-
sured using the Herndahl-Hirschman concentration index. First, product concentration











where k refers to products, xik is country i’s value of exports of product k, andXi is coun-
try i’s total value of exports. 5,223 is the total number of HS 2002 six-digit products. is
index measures how concentrated a country’s exports are on a small number of products.











where j refers to partner countries or destination markets and xij is the value of exports
from exporter i to importer j. 193 is the total number of partners. is index measures the
spread of a country’s exports across dierent destination markets. e two indices are
computed for the year 2007 and also averaged over 2005–2007 (3 years) and 2003–2007
(5 years) as a robustness check. eir values lie between 0 (perfect diversication) and 1
(perfect concentration)—the closer to 1, the lower the degree of export diversication.
Along with export concentration, the change in demand is controlled for with the
change in real GDP between 2008 and 2009 (∆GDPi = GDPi2009 − GDPi2008) and the
income level of a country is controlled for using the real GDP per capita of 2007. Further-
more, a proxy for the nancial health of a country is included to control for the change
in the availability of trade nance necessary for international transactions, which is par-
tially captured by the change in domestic credit provided to the private sector by banks
between 2008 and 2009 as follows:
∆Domestic crediti = Domestic crediti2009 − Domestic crediti2008.
e data on these three control variables are taken from the World Bank’s World Devel-
opment Indicators. GDP and per capita GDP are in constant 2017 international dollars.
3
Domestic private credit is in current U.S. dollars.
4
3
An international dollar can buy the same amount of goods and services as the U.S. dollar can in the United
States.
4
e data on domestic credit provided to the private sector by banks are recorded as a percentage of GDP. To
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4.2.2 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for the 124 countries included in the sample are reported in the top
section of Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. e average value of the product concentration in-
dex (HHIproducti ) in 2007 is 0.125, and the mean value of the market concentration index
(HHImarketi ) in 2007 is 0.145. e degree of export concentration varies greatly across the
sample countries. For example, in 2007, Aruba had the most concentrated export basket
in terms of products (HHIproducti = 1), while Italy had the most diversied export basket
in terms of products (HHIproducti = 0.003). Likewise, Mexico had the highest value of the
market concentration index at 0.679, while Turkey had the lowest value of the market
concentration index at 0.038.
e average trade collapse is a decrease in exports by 25.658 billion U.S. dollars. Among
the 124 countries in the sample, only 12 countries experienced a positive growth in ex-
ports; the rest saw a decline in their exports. e average change in real GDP and domestic
private credit is a decrease by 5.164 and 11.228 billion U.S. dollars, respectively. However,
61 countries experienced a rise in GDP between 2008 and 2009, and domestic credit to
the private sector by banks increased in 49 countries during the same period. Figure 4.1
shows the dip in average exports and domestic credit between 2008 and 2009.
4.2.3 OLS Results
e following model is estimated by OLS:




i + β3∆Domestic crediti
+ β4∆Domestic crediti ×HHIproducti + β5∆Domestic crediti ×HHImarketi
+ β6∆Real GDP i + β7Real GDP per capitai + β8Exportsi + αregion + ε
Both the product and market concentration indices are included. e sample correlation
coecient between the two is about 0.40 and the variance ination factor is 1.19. e -
nancial health of a country may be correlated with both the concentration indices and the
change in exports. For instance, countries that have healthier nancial institutions will be
more capable of extending trade nance to exporting rms, encouraging the production
and trade in a wider variety of goods to a larger number of markets. Financially healthier
countries may also experience a milder fall in trade nance activity during the global -
nancial crisis and consequently a smaller drop in their trade ows. erefore, the change
extract the dollar value, I multiply by GDP in current U.S. dollars (also from World Bank) and divide by 100.
Alternatively, I obtain data from the Other Depository Corporations Survey (line 22D) of the International
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics on claims on the private sector in domestic currency.
en I use the end of period exchange rates to convert the values to current U.S. dollars. e resulting two
variables have a sample correlation coecient that is nearly 1.
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in domestic credit provided to the private sector by banks is included to control for the
nancial health of a country. In addition, I control for the change in demand/production,
the level of income of a country, and trade volume in 2007. Lastly, region dummy vari-
ables
5
are included to absorb region specic shocks to exports. e results are reported
in Table 4.1.
e rst three columns are estimated without interaction terms. e coecient on
product concentration index is negative and statistically signicant in all six columns. For
example, column (1) says that on average, an increase in the product concentration index
by one standard deviation (0.189) decreases exports by 3.487 billion U.S. dollars, holding
other variables constant. In other words, the trade collapse is more severe for countries
with exports concentrated on a small number of products. Surprisingly, the coecient on
market concentration index is positive and statistically signicant, but the signicance
goes away with the inclusion of the interaction terms.
e next three columns include interaction terms between the change in domestic
credit and each export concentration index. To begin with, the eect of product concen-
tration on the fall in exports depends on the change in domestic credit. For example, for a
country that experienced the median change in domestic credit (-0.140 billion USD), a one
standard deviation increase in product concentration leads to a 2.116 billion U.S. dollars
6
fall in exports on average, holding all else constant (see column (4) of Table 4.1). Moreover,
the interaction terms serve to examine if the eect of the fall in domestic credit on the fall
in exports is milder for countries that are more diversied and have lower concentration
indices. e coecient on the interaction term between the change in domestic credit and
product concentration index is positive and statistically signicant. is nding suggests
that the more concentrated the exports are on few products, the stronger the relationship
between domestic credit availability and export ows. at is, countries whose exports
are more diversied across dierent products may be less susceptible to nancial shocks.
However, the coecient on the interaction term between the change in domestic credit
and market concentration is negative and statistically signicant. e magnitude of the
coecient is smaller, though. us, overall, the eects of domestic credit on the trade
collapse seem to intensify as exports become more concentrated provided that the values
of the two concentration indices are similar. e relationship between trade and trade -
nance as a function of export concentration is examined more carefully in the subsequent
5
e countries are categorized into seven groups: East Asia & Pacic, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America
& Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa, North America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Seven
dummy variables are created accordingly, of which six are added in the regression equation with North
America as the base category.




ere are two takeaways from the cross-country exercise. First, the trade collapse
between 2008 and 2009 was milder for countries whose exports were diversied across
dierent products. Second, the eect of the change in domestic credit on the trade col-
lapse was possibly stronger at higher levels of product concentration. In other words, for
countries that have a concentrated export basket in terms of products, the fall in domestic
credit due to the global nancial crisis may have meant that they had to reduce their ex-
ports by a larger amount than the countries that are more diversied across export goods.
e cross-country analysis also comes with caveats. e sample size of 124 is small and
there could be omied variables correlated with both the dependent and independent
variables making the estimated coecients biased. Moreover, the use of domestic credit
to the private sector by banks as a proxy for nancial health, specically trade nance
availability, may be problematic since it includes loans, purchases of nonequity securities,
and trade credits by all deposit money banks excluding the central bank to nance not
only international but also domestic activities in the private sector. In section 4.3 and sec-
tion 4.4, these limitations are complemented using disaggregated data (bilateral trade and
product-level data) and a xed eects model to control for all unobservables. In addition,
insured export credits are used to proxy for short term trade nance availability, which is
the best proxy available Auboin and Engemann (2014), Korinek et al. (2010).
4.3 Data
Building on the cross-country exercise of section 4.2, the current and following sections
use disaggregated data to study the eects of export concentration on the Great Trade Col-
lapse and the relationship of trade and trade nance as a function of export concentration.
Two types of data are used. One is bilateral trade data where the unit of observation is an
exporter-importer, and the other is product-level data where the unit of observation is an
exporter-product.
Annual export values in current U.S. dollars are downloaded from the UN Comtrade
Database for each exporter-importer and exporter-product pair, respectively, for the pe-
riod of 2008–2009. Product is dened at the HS 2002 six-digit level and 5,003 products
are included in the sample. In addition, the bilateral trade data contains 134 exporting
countries and 191 importing countries.
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4.3.1 Bilateral Exports
e dependent variable is the change in exports between 2008 and 2009 computed as the
following:
∆Exportsij = Exportsij2009 − Exportsij2008,
where ij refers to the exporter-importer pair. e average change in bilateral exports
during this period is a fall by 193.861 million U.S. dollars (see Table 4.2). e drop in
average bilateral exports between 2008 and 2009 is also conrmed in Figure 4.2 panel (a).
e two main independent variables are export concentration and the change in the
availability of trade nance. First, the product concentration index is computed for each











where Xij is the total value of exports from exporter i to importer j, and xijk is the value
of exports of product k from exporter i to importer j. 5,223 is the total number of HS 2002
six-digit products. is index measures how concentrated a country pair’s trade ows are
on a small number of products. e closer to 1, the more concentrated on few products;
the closer to 0, the more diversied across numerous products. e concentration index is
computed for the year 2007, which precedes the Great Trade Collapse and also averaged
over 2005–2007 and 2003–2007, respectively.
Second, trade nance availability (Trade nancej) is measured by short term
7
insured
export credit provided by Berne Union members around the world for exports to country j.
Berne Union, also known as the International Union of Credit and Investment Insurers, is
an international not-for-prot trade association, whose members consist of government-
backed export credit agencies, private insurers of credit and political risk, and multilateral
institutions. ese members provide insurance products to exporters and protect them
against losses derived from credit and political risks of importers (Berne Union (2021)).
e data on short term insured export credit reported by Berne Union come from the
Joint External Debt Hub in current U.S. dollars. is is the most extensive and consistent
data series currently available for trade nance
8
Auboin and Engemann (2014), Korinek
7
Short term refers to credit insurance for trade goods and services, as opposed to capital equipment trans-
actions and infrastructure projects, with credit terms up to and including twelve months.
8
Trade nance can be either funded or unfunded. Unfunded trade nance products are focused on mitigating
the payment risk from the importer (buyer) and the supply/performance risk of the exporter (seller). ese
products transfer the trade risks to the nancial sector and guarantee that the exporter will ship the goods
and the importer will pay for the goods. Examples include credit insurance and leers of credit. On
the other hand, funded trade nance products focus on the provision of funding and liquidity such as
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et al. (2010). Because the stock values are reported quarterly, the annual change in the
availability of trade nance between 2008 and 2009 is computed as the following:
∆Trade nancej = Trade nancej2009Q2 − Trade nancej2008Q2,
where j refers to the importing country and Q2 refers to the second quarter. e sec-
ond quarter is used because insured export credit peaks in the second quarter and falls
thereaer as can be seen in Figure 4.3. Note that the variable varies across importing
countries.
4.3.2 Product-Level Exports
e dependent variable, the change in product exports between 2008 and 2009 is dened
as the following:
∆Exportsik = Exportsik2009 − Exportsik2008,
where k refers to the product. e average change in product exports is a decline by 10.588
million U.S. dollars (see Table 4.2) and the drop during this period is shown in Figure 4.2
panel (b).
e two main independent variables are export concentration and nancial vulnera-












where Xik is the total value of exports of product k from exporter i and 193 is the total
number of destination markets. e value of the concentration index falls between 0
(perfect diversication) and 1 (perfect concentration) and is computed for the year 2007,
averaged over 3 years (2005–2007), and averaged over 5 years (2003–2007) to check for
robustness.
Second, the nancial vulnerability of a product is measured in three ways follow-
ing Chor and Manova (2012) but using the stock measures
9
presented in Fisman and
Love (2003). e three measures are External nance dependencek, Trade credit accessk,
and Asset tangibilityk constructed as follows:
External nance dependencek =
Total assets - Retained earnings
Total assets
accelerated receivables to the exporter and extended credit to the importer Trade Finance Global (2020). e
trade nance variable in this paper refers to unfunded trade nance, specically export credit insurance.
9
Stock measures are used in lieu of ow measures because they are more stable over time. Since the nancial
vulnerability measures presented here are time invariant, the stability of the measures over time maers.
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Net property, plant and equipment
Total assets
A product is considered nancially vulnerable when it is highly dependent on external
nance, has limited access to trade credit, and has a low endowment of tangible assets
such as real estate, machinery, and plant, which can serve as collateral when securing
external nance. Data on each of the items are from Compustat North America, a database
containing information on U.S. and Canadian publicly-held companies. Aer restricting
to rms that report consolidated nancial statements, the three nancial vulnerability
measures are computed for each rm and year. en the rm average is computed over
the period 1998–2007. Finally, for each SIC industry, the median value across all the rms
within the industry is chosen as the industry/product nancial vulnerability measure.
Because the reported SIC codes dier in the number of digits, the measure computed for
each four-digit industry is used when available and replaced with the three-digit or two-
digit industry measure when not available. To merge with the trade data, the SIC codes
are matched to the HS 2002 codes using the concordance in WITS. Note that the nancial
vulnerability variables vary across industries due to technological reasons and not across
countries. e assumption is that the U.S. has one of the most developed nancial systems,
and the technological demand for credit identied using U.S. data is carried over to other
countries Rajan and Zingales (1998), Fisman and Love (2003), Braun (2005), Chor and
Manova (2012).
4.4 Fixed Eects Results
is section introduces the model to be estimated and the regression results using bilateral
trade data in section 4.4.1 and product-level exports data in section 4.4.2.
4.4.1 Bilateral Exports
e following xed eects model is estimated:
∆Exportsij = β0 + β1HHI
product
ij + β2∆Trade nancej ×HHI
product
ij
+ β3Exportsij + αi + αj + εij,
where i is the exporter and j is the importer. Trade volume of 2007 is controlled for to
account for scale eects, and exporter (αi) and importer (αj) eects are included. e
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country eects capture both observed and unobserved country characteristics such as the
size, wealth, and nancial health of a country. e change in the availability of trade
nance between 2008 and 2009 is also absorbed in the importer eects, which is why it
only appears in the interaction term with product concentration.
e regression results are reported in Table 4.4. e rst three columns do not contain
the interaction term. e estimated coecient on product concentration is negative and
statistically signicant. On average, a rise in the 2007 product concentration index by one
standard deviation (0.307) results in a decrease in exports by 15.956 million U.S. dollars,
holding all else constant (see column (1) of Table 4.4). is result implies that country
pairs whose trade is more diversied across a large number of products fared beer in the
global nancial crisis.
In the next three columns, the interaction term between the change in trade nance
availability and the product concentration index is included to examine if the eect of
trade nance on trade changes by the degree of product concentration. With the inter-
action term, the eect of product concentration on the fall in bilateral exports depends
on the value of the change in trade nance. For example, on average, for a country pair
where the importer experienced the median change in trade nance availability (-72 mil-
lion USD), raising the product concentration index by one standard deviation decreases
bilateral exports by 1.29 million U.S. dollars
10
, holding all else constant (see column (4)
of Table 4.4). Furthermore, the estimated coecient on the interaction term is positive
and statistically signicant, implying that the susceptibility to trade nance shocks grows
with the degree of product concentration. In other words, the eects of trade nance on
trade are mitigated when a country pair’s trade is diversied across a large number of
products. To give an example, given a one standard deviation (2,874.455 million USD)
decrease in trade nance availability, the country pair whose product concentration is at
the 75th percentile (more concentrated) experiences a further drop in exports by 57.489
million U.S. dollars compared to the country pair whose product concentration is at the
25th percentile (more diversied) (refer to column (4) of Table 4.4).
11
10[b1 + b2 ∗ (Median ∆Trade nance)] ∗ (Std. dev. of HHIproduct) = [−1.035 + 0.044 ∗ (−72)] ∗ 0.307 =
−1.29
11
Let the estimated coecient on ∆Trade nance be b4, which is assumed to be positive and cannot be
estimated because trade nance is absorbed in the importer eects. en the marginal eect of the change
in trade nance on the export fall is b2 ∗HHIproduct + b4 = 0.044 ∗HHIproduct + b4.
Marginal eect when HHIproduct is in the 25th percentile (0.089): 0.044 * 0.089 + b4 = 0.004 + b4
Marginal eect when HHIproduct is in the 75th percentile (0.538): 0.044 * 0.538 + b4 = 0.024 + b4
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4.4.2 Product-Level Exports
e following xed eects model is estimated:
∆Exportsik = β0 + β1HHI
market
ik + β2Financial vulnerabilityk ×HHI
market
ik
+ β3Exportsik + αi + αk + εik,
where i is the exporter and k is the importer. Trade volume of 2007 is included to control
for scale eects, and exporter (αi) and product (αk) eects are added. Product eects cap-
ture any inherent characteristics of products such as nancial vulnerability, factor inten-
sity, and supply/demand shocks. In addition, an interaction term between each measure
of nancial vulnerability and the market concentration index is included. Since nancial
vulnerability is absorbed in the product eects, it only appears in the interaction term.
e results are reported in Table 4.5. External nance dependence is interacted with
the market concentration indices in the rst three columns. e next three columns report
the estimates for the interaction terms between access to trade credit and the market
concentration indices. In the last three columns, asset tangibility is interacted with the
concentration indices. Chor and Manova (2012) nds that exports of nancially vulnerable
industries were more sensitive to the cost of external capital and experienced a greater
trade collapse when credit conditions tightened during the global nancial crisis. e
interaction terms are included to examine if these industries experienced larger falls when
product exports are concentrated on a small number of destination markets.
e sign on the market concentration index coecients is not consistent and changes
with the measure of nancial vulnerability chosen. However, the coecient on the inter-
action terms between external nance dependence and market concentration is negative
and statistically signicant. Since products highly reliant on external nance experienced
a larger decline in trade (negative coecient on external nance dependence), the rela-
tionship between external nance dependence and the trade collapse becomes more dra-
matic (more negative) with the increase in the market concentration index. For instance,
when a product’s dependence on external nance grows by one standard deviation (0.388),
the exporter-product pair whose market concentration is at the 75th percentile (more con-
centrated) sees its exports go down by 4.337 million U.S. dollars
12
more than the exporter-
product pair whose market concentration is at the 25th percentile (more diversied). See
column (1) of Table 4.5.
12
Let the estimated coecient on External nance dependence be b5 < 0, which cannot be estimated because
nancial vulnerability is absorbed in the product eects. en the marginal eect of the dependence on
external nance on the fall in exports is b2 ∗HHImarket + b5 = (−21.170) ∗HHImarket + b5.
Marginal eect when HHImarket is in the 25th percentile (0.223): (-21.170) * 0.223 + b5 = -4.721 + b5
Marginal eect when HHImarket is in the 75th percentile (0.751): (-21.170) * 0.751 + b5 = -15.899 + b5
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Likewise, the coecient on the interaction term between asset tangibility and market
concentration is positive and statistically signicant. Since products with a high share of
hard assets experienced a smaller reduction in trade (positive coecient on asset tangi-
bility), this implies that the eect of asset tangibility on exports is stronger (more posi-
tive) with a higher value of market concentration index. As an illustration, when a prod-
uct’s endowment of hard assets decreases by one standard deviation (0.132), the exporter-
product pair whose market concentration is at the 75th percentile (more concentrated)
experiences a greater trade collapse by 7.667 million U.S. dollars
13
relative to the exporter-
product pair whose market concentration is at the 25th percentile (more diversied). See
column (7) of Table 4.5. e interaction term between access to trade credit and the con-
centration index is not statistically signicant. is is consistent with Levchenko et al.
(2010) which nds no evidence that industries with higher trade credit intensity expere-
rienced higher percentage reductions in trade.
4.5 Conclusion
e Great Trade Collapse was synchronized in that nearly all countries and product cat-
egories experienced a decline in trade (Baldwin, 2009). e paper nds that the trade col-
lapse was greater for exporter-importer pairs whose exports were more concentrated on a
small number of products. In addition, numerous studies have found that trade ows are
reliant on trade nance because exporting rms need working capital loans while wait-
ing to get paid and insurance to hedge the inherent risks associated with trade Amiti and
Weinstein (2011), Auboin and Engemann (2014), Chor and Manova (2012), Korinek et al.
(2010). is paper nds that the relationship between trade and trade nance depends on
the level of export concentration.
In the bilateral trade data, the product concentration index is computed for each exporter-
importer pair and trade nance availability is captured by short term insured trade credits
granted by Berne Union members. e product concentration index is signicant both
independently and through the interaction term with the change in trade nance avail-
ability. For country pairs whose bilateral trade was more concentrated on few products,
exports decreased further. In addition, the eects of the change in trade nance availabil-
ity on the change in exports were stronger when the product concentration index was
higher. In other words, the fall in trade resulting from the fall in trade nance was milder
13
Let the estimated coecient on Asset tangibility be b6, assumed to be positive. en the marginal eect
of the share of tangible assets on the export fall is b2 ∗HHImarket + b5 = (110.012) ∗HHImarket + b5.
Marginal eect when HHImarket is in the 25th percentile (0.223): (110.012) * 0.223 + b5 = 24.533 + b5
Marginal eect when HHImarket is in the 75th percentile (0.751): (110.012) * 0.751 + b5 = 82.619 + b5
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for country pairs with lower product concentration indices (more diversied).
In the product-level trade data, the market concentration index is computed for each
exporter-product pair and the nancial vulnerability of a product is measured by either
external nance dependence, access to trade credit, or asset tangibility. Unlike the prod-
uct concentration index, market concentration is not consistently signicant on its own.
However, it is signicant when interacted with external nance dependence and asset
tangibility. Financially vulnerable industries were more sensitive to the cost of capital, re-
sulting in greater reductions in trade during the global nancial crisis Chor and Manova
(2012). is paper nds that the exports of nancially vulnerable products, which have
a high dependence on external nance and low share of hard assets, experienced bigger
drops in trade as exports were more concentrated on a small number of trade partners.
In both datasets, trade diversication serves as a substitute for trade nance. If trade is
concentrated on few products or markets, the susceptibility to trade nance shocks grows,
and therefore, the contraction in the availability of trade nance during the global nan-
cial crisis is a bigger hit. In this regard, countries whose exports were diversied across
dierent products and markets did indeed fare beer during the Great Trade Collapse of
2008–2009. is is yet another reason for countries to diversify their exports—not only to
reduce export instability as in Han (2021a) but also to reduce the susceptibility to trade
nance shocks.
4.6 Tables
See next couple of pages.
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Table 4.1: ∆Exportsi, 2008-2009: OLS Results (Country-Level Trade)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)



























∆Domestic Private Credit 08-09 -0.018 -0.018∗ -0.018 0.024 0.010 0.012
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.024) (0.019) (0.019)
∆Domestic Private Credit 08-09 × HHI product 07 2.292∗∗∗
(0.155)
∆Domestic Private Credit 08-09 × Average HHI product 05-07 2.133∗∗∗
(0.140)
∆Domestic Private Credit 08-09 × Average HHI product 03-07 2.249∗∗∗
(0.163)
∆Domestic Private Credit 08-09 × HHI market 07 -0.937∗∗
(0.368)
∆Domestic Private Credit 08-09 × Average HHI market 05-07 -0.686∗∗
(0.279)
∆Domestic Private Credit 08-09 × Average HHI market 03-07 -0.683∗∗
(0.273)
∆Real GDP 08-09 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Real GDP per capita 07 35.437 38.685 38.651 14.981 17.954 18.074
(52.423) (53.684) (54.579) (41.399) (42.211) (42.577)












(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 124 124 124 124 124 124
Adjusted R2 0.962 0.962 0.961 0.972 0.972 0.972
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics - Dependent Variable (Change in Exports 2008-09)
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Exporter i (N=124)
∆Exports 08-09 (bil USD) -25.658 -4.624 53.095 -338.297 1.261
Exporter-importer ij (N=15,869)
∆Exports 08-09 (mil USD) -193.861 -0.570 1,649.261 -117,301.758 6,319.444
Exporter-product ik (N=278,597)
∆Exports 08-09 (mil USD) -10.588 -0.034 249.587 -58,088.375 17,188.068
i: Exporter, j: importer, k: product
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics - Independent Variables
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Exporter i (N=124)
HHI product 07 0.125 0.048 0.189 0.003 1.000
Average HHI product 05-07 0.129 0.049 0.184 0.003 0.866
Average HHI product 03-07 0.131 0.053 0.186 0.003 0.876
HHI market 07 0.145 0.101 0.122 0.038 0.679
Average HHI market 05-07 0.153 0.108 0.130 0.041 0.713
Average HHI market 03-07 0.158 0.114 0.133 0.042 0.740
∆Domestic Private Credit 08-09 (bil USD) -11.228 -0.140 202.711 -991.313 1,660.555
∆Real GDP 08-09 (bil USD) -5.164 -0.067 107.680 -426.700 922.900
Real GDP per capita 07 (mil USD) 0.024 0.015 0.023 0.001 0.115
Country Exports 07 (bil USD) 101.686 13.531 221.784 0.016 1,328.841
Exporter-importer ij (N=15,869)
HHI product 07 0.347 0.245 0.307 0.003 1.000
Average HHI product 05-07 0.354 0.280 0.288 0.003 1.000
Average HHI product 03-07 0.359 0.292 0.284 0.003 1.000
Bilateral exports 07 (mil USD) 773.888 8.532 6,402.416 0.000 331,601.969
Exporter-product ik (N=278,597)
HHI market 07 0.490 0.424 0.308 0.019 1.000
Average HHI market 05-07 0.498 0.463 0.285 0.022 1.000
Average HHI market 03-07 0.505 0.480 0.278 0.023 1.000
Product exports 07 (mil USD) 41.756 0.541 547.330 0.000 113,822.109
Importer j (N=191)
∆Trade nance 08-09 (mil USD) -1,151.251 -72.000 2,874.455 -20,731.000 428.000
Product k (N=5,003)
External nance dependence 1.059 1.000 0.388 0.455 5.957
Trade credit reliance 0.086 0.085 0.025 0.019 0.213
Asset tangibility 0.299 0.311 0.132 0.054 0.790
i: Exporter, j: importer, k: product
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Table 4.4: ∆Exportsij , 2008-2009: Fixed Eects Results (Bilateral Trade)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












∆Trade nance 08-09 × HHI product 07 0.044∗
(0.025)
∆Trade nance 08-09 × Average HHI product 05-07 0.052∗
(0.029)
∆Trade nance 08-09 × Average HHI product 03-07 0.053∗
(0.030)












(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Exporter FE (αi) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer FE (αj) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,990 15,990 15,990 15,869 15,869 15,869
Adjusted R2 0.818 0.819 0.819 0.819 0.819 0.819
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
6
7
Table 4.5: ∆Exportsik, 2008-2009: Fixed Eects Results (Product-Level Trade)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)















Ext n dep × HHI market 07 -21.170∗∗∗
(4.253)
Ext n dep × Avg HHI market 05-07 -26.622∗∗∗
(5.241)
Ext n dep × Avg HHI market 03-07 -28.636∗∗∗
(5.550)
Trade cred rel × HHI market 07 42.779
(33.349)
Trade cred rel × Avg HHI market 05-07 52.998
(40.691)
Trade cred rel × Avg HHI market 03-07 61.365
(43.391)
Asset tang × HHI market 07 110.012∗∗∗
(22.523)
Asset tang × Avg HHI market 05-07 129.538∗∗∗
(24.022)
Asset tang × Avg HHI market 03-07 134.641∗∗∗
(24.958)


















(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Exporter FE (αi) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE (αk) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 278,597 278,597 278,597 278,597 278,597 278,597 278,597 278,597 278,597
R2 0.606 0.606 0.606 0.606 0.606 0.606 0.607 0.607 0.607
Robust standard errors in parentheses




Figure 4.1: Trade and Domestic Private Credit over Time
(a) Country exports (b) Domestic credit to the private sector by banks
Figure 4.2: Trade over Time
(a) Bilateral trade (exporter-importer) (b) Product-level trade (exporter-product)
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Figure 4.3: Trade Finance over Time
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Appendices
Appendix A: Variable Construction for Chapter 2
Export Concentration
Two measures of export concentration are computed using the Herndahl-Hirschman
concentration index: one across industries and the other across partners.
14
First, for each
country pair, HH industryijt is computed as the following across industries dened at the










Xijt is the total value of exports from exporter i to importer j in year t, while xijkt is the
value of exports of industry k from reporter i to partner j in year t. nk is the number
of potential SITC four-digit industries which is 625. is index measures the dispersion
of export value across the 625 industries and ranges from 0 (perfect diversication) to 1
(perfect concentration). For instance, a country pair whose export value is concentrated
on a few sectors will have an index value close to 1 and be more vulnerable to trade
shocks. Second, for each exporter-industry pair, HHmarketikt is computed as the following










Xikt is the total value of exports of industry k from exporter i in year t andnj is the number
of potential partners which is 194. is index measures the spread of export value across
the 194 destination countries. As before, the index lies between 0 and 1, and a lower index
indicates a broader partner base and lower dependency on certain trading partners.
Like export concentration, import concentration is also computed using the Herndahl-
Hirschman concentration index. HHmarketjkt is computed for each importer-industry pair











ese measures are similar to those in Section 2 (Export Diversication) of the User’s Manual for the
Online Trade Outcomes Indicators. e dierence is that the product and market diversication indicators
in the manual are computed for each exporting country (as opposed to country pair or exporter-industry
pair) across products and partners, respectively.
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Xjkt is the total value of imports of industry k and importer j in year t, xijkt is the value
of imports of industry k and importer j from exporter i in year t, and ni is the number of
potential source countries which is 189. e index measures the dispersion of an importer-
industry pair’s import value across the 189 exporters and takes the value between 0 and 1.
A lower index represents greater import diversication across various source countries.
Durability
e division of SITC industries into durable and nondurable goods sectors comes from
Engel and Wang (2011). Matching the code description to that in the SITC Rev. 1 data,
the following categories are classied as durable goods: 61 Leather, leather manufactures,
n.e.s., and dressed furskins; 62 Rubber manufactures, n.e.s.; 66 Non-metallic mineral man-
ufactures, n.e.s.; 67 Iron and steel; 68 Non-ferrous metals; 69 Manufactures of metal, n.e.s.;
7 Machinery and transport equipment; 81 Sanitary, plumbing, heating and lighting x-
tures; 82 Furniture; 86 Scientic and controlling instruments, photographic goods, clocks;
96 Coin, other than gold coin, not legal tender. e durable goods indicator variable is
created such that it is given a value of 1 if the SITC industry is a durable goods sector and
0 otherwise.
Vertical Linkages
Two measures of vertical linkages are constructed at the industry level. First, an indicator
of downstream vertical linkages based on the U.S. Input-Output tables as in Levchenko
et al. (2010). Second, a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the industry is an
intermediate goods industry dened by the Broad Economic Categories (BEC).
i. Indicator of downstream vertical linkages
e commodity by industry direct requirements data from the U.S. Input-Output (I-O)
benchmark accounts for the year 2007 are downloaded from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). Each cell, (i, j), of the Direct Requirements Table records how much of
commodity i (in row i) is directly required as an input to produce a dollar’s worth of indus-
try output j (in column j). For each commodity (row), the average value of the elements
across all industries (columns) is computed to create an indicator of downstream verti-
cal linkages. is measure represents the average use of a commodity as an intermediate
input by other downstream industries and is computed for the year 2007.
In the same data le downloaded from the BEA, the associated 2012 NAICS codes
are presented for each I-O code for which the indicator of downstream vertical linkages
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is computed. e 2012 NAICS codes are then matched to 2007 NAICS codes, which are
again matched to 2002 NAICS codes, which are nally matched to 1987 SIC codes using
the concordances in Census. When an I-O industry matches to two or more 2012 NAICS
industries, the laer industries share the same value of the downstream vertical linkages
indicator. When multiple I-O industries are matched to one 2012 NAICS industry, the
mean value of the measure is assigned. e same steps are taken when matching codes
from 2012 NAICS to 2007 NAICS to 2002 NAICS to 1987 SIC. In addition, the related 2012
NAICS codes presented for each I-O code dier in the number of digits ranging from
two to six digits. For this reason, the concordances are created for each digit, merged
separately, and then appended.
Finally, using the concordances in WITS from HS 1988/1992 to 1987 SIC and HS 1988/1992
to SITC Rev. 1, the 1987 SIC codes are matched to the SITC Rev. 1 codes.
ii. Intermediate goods sector binary variable
According to UN Trade Statistics, the following eight BEC categories constitute intermedi-
ate goods: 111 Food and beverages, primary, mainly for industry; 121 Food and beverages,
processed, mainly for industry; 21 Industrial supplies not elsewhere specied, primary; 22
Industrial supplies not elsewhere specied, processed; 31 Fuels and lubricants, primary;
322 Fuels and lubricants, processed (other than motor spirit); 42 Parts and accessories of
capital goods (except transport equipment); 53 Parts and accessories of transport equip-
ment. erefore, the intermediate goods dummy variable takes the value 1 if the BEC code
corresponds to one of the above; 0 otherwise. World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)
provides mapping between SITC Rev. 1 and BEC codes. A couple of SITC codes are
matched to multiple BEC codes, and thus, multiple values of the intermediate goods in-
dicator variable. e mode value of the intermediate goods dummy variable is assigned
when there is one. When equally split between 0 and 1, the SITC industry is treated
as a non-intermediate goods industry (i.e., assign the value 0 to the intermediate goods
dummy variable).
Industry Financial Vulnerability
Following Chor and Manova (2012) but using the stock measures presented in Fisman and
Love (2003), three variables of industry nancial vulnerability are constructed as follows:
External nance dependencestock =
Total assets - Retained earnings
Total assets





Net property, plant and equipment
Total assets
Data on each of the items are from Compustat North America, a database contain-
ing information on U.S. and Canadian publicly-held companies. Aer restricting to rms
that report consolidated nancial statements, the three nancial vulnerability measures
are computed for each rm and year. en the rm average is computed over the period
1962-2011. Finally, for each SIC industry, the median value across all the rms within the
industry is chosen as the industry nancial vulnerability measure. To check robustness,
I exclude industries for which there are fewer than ve companies to compute the indus-
try nancial vulnerability measures. In addition, as an alternative, I use ow measures of
External nance dependence15 and Trade credit reliance16 in lieu of stock measures in the
estimation. In both cases, the two measures are either statistically (External nance depen-
dence) or economically insignicant (Trade credit reliance), which is consistent with the
main results. Because the reported SIC codes dier in the number of digits, the measure
computed for each four-digit industry is used when available and replaced with the three-
digit or two-digit industry measure when not available. To merge with the trade data, the
SIC codes are matched to the SITC Rev. 1 codes using the concordances in WITS.
Trade Integration
e presence of trade agreements between country pairs is controlled for using two vari-
ables: FTA and GATT/WTO dummy variables. e NSF-Kellogg Institute Economic In-
tegration Agreements (EIA) database records the level of economic integration of each
country pair from 1950 to 2012. e FTA dummy variable takes on the value 1 if the
exporting and importing countries are members of a free trade area or a deeper form of
economic integration such as a customs union, common market, and economic union in
a particular year as recorded in the EIA database.
17
e GATT/WTO dummy variable as-
sumes the value 1 if both countries are members of the General Agreement on Taris and
15
External nance dependenceflow =
Capital expenditures - Total funds from operations
Capital expenditures
16




In Ederington et al. (2021), we use a multichotomous index (as in the EIA database) that is given an in-
teger value between 0 (no agreement) and 6 (economic union) and increases with the level of economic
integration, in lieu of the FTA dummy variable used here. We also include six separate dummy variables
pertaining to each category to examine the heterogeneous eects of the types of regional trade agreements
on trade volatility.
74
Trade or World Trade Organization in a specic year, including nonmember participants
such as colonies, de facto members, and provisional members as GATT/WTO members
Tomz et al. (2007).
Appendix B: Additional Tables for Chapter 2
Table A1: Correlation between Financial Vulnerability Measures
Ext nance dep Trade credit rel Asset Tangibility
Ext nance dep 1
Trade credit rel -0.1525
∗∗∗
1
Asset tangibility -0.0198 -0.4803
∗∗∗
1
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A2: Industry-Level Trade with Intermediate Dummy (ikt)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)







































(0.655) (0.665) (0.764) (1.015) (1.048) (1.193)
External nance dependence 0.392 0.333
(0.805) (1.261)
Trade credit reliance 11.492 22.685
(15.610) (24.518)
Asset tangibility 2.303 -5.735
(3.448) (6.112)












(0.250) (0.251) (0.250) (0.186) (0.187) (0.187)
Exporter FE (αi) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter-Year FE (αit) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE (αt) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,376,508 1,376,508 1,376,508 1,376,508 1,376,508 1,376,508
R2 0.269 0.269 0.269 0.074 0.074 0.074
Standard errors are two-way clustered by exporter & industry and reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A3: Industry-Level Trade Restricted to Developing Countries (ikt)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)


























(0.834) (0.809) (0.838) (1.087) (1.115) (1.204)












(2.141) (2.177) (2.463) (3.140) (3.142) (3.494)
External nance dependence -0.853 -1.391
(0.872) (1.188)






















(0.506) (0.511) (0.505) (0.165) (0.159) (0.183)
Exporter FE (αi) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter-Year FE (αit) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE (αt) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 732,666 732,666 732,666 732,666 732,666 732,666
R2 0.197 0.197 0.197 0.047 0.047 0.048
Standard errors are two-way clustered by exporter & industry and reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A4: Bilateral Trade at the Industry Level Where At Least One Country Is Developing
(ijkt)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instability 1 Instability 2
HHI industry 0.481 0.501 0.494 0.350 0.399 0.392







































(0.765) (0.754) (0.752) (1.039) (1.028) (1.051)








(1.802) (1.788) (2.077) (2.623) (2.587) (2.854)
External nance dependence -0.648 -0.603
(1.062) (1.495)

















(0.474) (0.472) (0.470) (0.699) (0.697) (0.697)
GATT/WTO dummy 0.757 0.737 0.724 2.188 2.148 2.114
(0.801) (0.795) (0.795) (1.718) (1.711) (1.717)












(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Exporter-Importer FE (αij) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter-Year FE (αit) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Importer-Year FE (αjt) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE (αt) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,339,624 16,339,624 16,339,624 16,339,624 16,339,624 16,339,624
R2 0.102 0.102 0.103 0.031 0.031 0.031
Standard errors are three-way clustered by exporter, importer, & industry and reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A5: Alternative Export Instability Measure - Instability 3 (ijkt)
Instability 3
(1) (2) (3)






























External nance dependence 0.281
(1.197)






FTA dummy -0.432 -0.410 -0.401
(0.474) (0.472) (0.471)
GATT/WTO dummy 1.953 1.900 1.887
(1.572) (1.562) (1.568)







Exporter-Importer FE (αij) Yes Yes Yes
Exporter-Year FE (αit) Yes Yes Yes
Importer-Year FE (αjt) Yes Yes Yes
Year FE (αt) Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,279,398 24,279,398 24,279,398
R2 0.029 0.029 0.029
Standard errors are three-way clustered by exporter, importer, & industry and reported in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix C: Alternative Volatility Measures for Chapter 3
As previously noted, the choice of volatility measure is necessarily ad-hoc. us, in this
section, we consider some alternate measures of trade volatility that have been used pre-
viously in the literature.
First, while Rose (2005) uses the coecient of variation of log trade ows, similar
to our measure in section 3.4, Manseld and Reinhardt (2008) uses the absolute value
of the dierence in year-to-year log trade ows. Indeed, Manseld and Reinhardt (2008)
argues that any discrepancy in results between the two papers is likely due to the dierent
measures of volatility. us, in column 1 of Table A6 we rerun the regression using the
absolute value of the dierence in log trade ows:
Ab log di =
∣∣lnXijkt − lnXijk(t−1)∣∣ (4.1)
as the dependent variable. As can be seen, the results are qualitatively similar.
Second, an implication of analyzing the volatility of log trade ows is that it com-
presses the data and thus reduces the weights on large changes in (absolute) trade ows.
us, as an additional robustness check we consider two alternative measures. In column










is measure is similar to those used in Han (2021a), Massell (1964), and Wong (1986).
In column 3 of Table A6 we use a year-to-year version of the widely used Coppock (1977)





As can be seen, both measures give results qualitatively similar to those reported in
section 3.4.
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Table A6: Dierent Measures in the Literature
(1) (2) (3)








L.GATT/WTO dummy -0.005 -0.002 -3.031
∗
(0.009) (0.006) (1.800)







Exporter-industry-year (αikt) Yes Yes Yes
Importer-industry-year (αjkt) Yes Yes Yes
Exporter-importer-industry (αijk) Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,050,547 23,050,547 23,050,547
R2 0.445 0.449 0.514
Standard errors are clustered by country pair and reported in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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